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ABSTRACT
Near Data Processing for Efficient and Trusted Systems
by
Shaizeen Aga
Chair: Satish Narayanasamy
We live in a world which constantly produces data at a rate which only increases with
time. Conventional processor architectures fail to process this abundant data in an efficient
manner as they expend significant energy in instruction processing and moving data over
deep memory hierarchies. Furthermore, to process large amounts of data in a cost effective
manner, there is increased demand for remote computation. While cloud service providers
have come up with innovative solutions to cater to this increased demand, the security
concerns users feel for their data remains a strong impediment to their wide scale adoption.
An exciting technique in our repertoire to deal with these challenges is near-data pro-
cessing. Near-data processing (NDP) is a data-centric paradigm which moves computation
to where data resides. This dissertation exploits NDP to both process the data deluge we
face efficiently and design low-overhead secure hardware designs.
To this end, we first propose Compute Caches, a novel NDP technique. Simple augmen-
xii
tations to underlying SRAM design enable caches to perform commonly used operations.
In-place computation in caches not only avoids excessive data movement over memory
hierarchy, but also significantly reduces instruction processing energy as independent sub-
units inside caches perform computation in parallel. Compute Caches significantly improve
the performance and reduce energy expended for a suite of data intensive applications.
Second, this dissertation identifies security advantages of NDP. While memory bus
side channel has received much attention, a low-overhead hardware design which defends
against it remains elusive. We observe that smart memory, memory with compute capa-
bility, can dramatically simplify this problem. To exploit this observation, we propose
InvisiMem which uses the logic layer in the smart memory to implement cryptographic
primitives, which aid in addressing memory bus side channel efficiently. Our solutions
obviate the need for expensive constructs like Oblivious RAM (ORAM) and Merkle trees,
and have one to two orders of magnitude lower overheads for performance, space, energy,
and memory bandwidth, compared to prior solutions.
This dissertation also addresses a related vulnerability of page fault side channel in
which the Operating System (OS) induces page faults to learn application’s address trace
and deduces application secrets from it. To tackle it, we propose Sanctuary which obfus-
cates page fault channel while allowing the OS to manage memory as a resource. To do so,
we design a novel construct, Oblivious Page Management (OPAM) which is derived from
ORAM but is customized for page management context. We employ near-memory page
moves to reduce OPAM overhead and also propose a novel memory partition to reduce
OPAM transactions required. For a suite of cloud applications which process sensitive data
we show that page fault channel can be tackled at reasonable overheads.
xiii
CHAPTER I
Introduction
We are constantly being bombarded with new data everyday from varied sources. Nearly
90% of data that exists today has been produced in just the last two years, and we continue
to generate nearly 2.5 quintillion bytes per day [3]. Analyzing this data holds the key
to answering many unsolved problems, from accurate weather prediction to personalized
medicine.
This data deluge, however, has exposed us to several challenges that need addressing.
First, it has brought to light severe inefficiencies in conventional architectures which were
not designed with this unprecedented data deluge in mind. Second, it has brought forth new
pressing needs like increased demand for secure remote computations that need efficient
solutions. The focus of this dissertation is to identify these inefficiencies, new pressing
needs and address them efficiently with innovative architectural solutions.
An important shortcoming of conventional architectures that we focus on in this work
is their compute centric nature. Today’s conventional architectures spend large amounts
of energy and time in instruction processing and data movement over deep memory hi-
erarchies and very little on actual computation. Vector units available today only reduce
1
instruction processing overhead to some extent. This makes conventional architectures
ill-equipped to run current data centric applications which process large amounts of data.
Given the wealth of interesting insights this data holds, it is paramount to design architec-
tures which address these inefficiencies and which can process humongous amounts of data
in an efficient manner both from performance and energy perspective.
Furthermore, there is an increased demand for remote computation to process the data
explosion we are facing in a cost effective manner. Cloud computing solutions are being
increasingly looked up to in order to meet this demand. While cloud service providers are
innovating at a lightning pace in the breadth of services they provide, from large graph pro-
cessing to genetic data processing, the security concerns users feels for their data remains
a strong impediment to adoption of cloud computing. As a consequence, there is a press-
ing need for low-overhead hardware designs which provide strong privacy and security
guarantees.
An exciting technique in our repertoire to deal with these challenges is near-data pro-
cessing (NDP). Prior works have observed that moving computation to where data is (as is
done in NDP) is one way we can tackle the data deluge we are facing today. The research in
this dissertation, however, harnesses NDP in novel ways and brings out hitherto untapped
benefits of this paradigm.
To this end, we first push NDP to a new extreme where we not only move computation
to where data is but transform existing memory elements (caches) into computation units.
Second, this dissertation also shows that NDP not only has energy and performance effi-
ciency benefits but it can also help us provide security guarantees in an efficient manner.
As such, the research in this dissertation proposes low-overhead defenses to tackle memory
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bus side channel and page fault side channel. Next, we give a brief overview of each of
these solutions.
1.1 Compute Caches: Efficient Very Large Vector Processing
This dissertation identifies a novel way to exploit the NDP paradigm by enabling pro-
cessor caches to perform computation. We propose the Compute Cache architecture which
enables in-place computation in caches. To do so, Compute Caches use the emerging bit-
line SRAM circuit technology [73, 76] to re-purpose existing cache elements and transform
them into active very large vector computational units. Using such a transformation helps
us support several operations: copy, search, compare and logical operations (and, or, xor,
and not) which are widely used primitives and can help accelerate a wide variety of appli-
cations.
Efficiency of Compute Caches arises from two main sources: massive parallelism and
reduced energy due to data movement. A cache is typically organized as a set of smaller
memory arrays. A typical high-end processor has thousands of these memory arrays. All
these memory arrays can potentially compute concurrently on data items stored in them,
enabling us to efficiently exploit large scale data-level parallelism (e.g., 30 MB of cache can
be repurposed as 960K bit-serial computation units). Furthermore, since the computation
is done in-place within a cache sub-array, without transferring data in or out of it, the
energy and performance overhead incurred in on-chip data movement — transferring data
to and from the core, interconnects, and various levels of memory hierarchy — is drastically
reduced.
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We address several challenges in realizing the Compute Cache architecture. We discuss
instruction set extensions and system software support needed to realize Compute Caches.
We identify and solve a new problem unique to Compute Caches that we refer to as operand
locality, which is borne out of the requirement that the data operands be stored in caches
such that they share the same set of bit-lines. We also discuss simple solutions to problems
such as managing parallelism across various cache levels and banks that arise as a conse-
quence of integrating compute capable caches into a conventional cache hierarchy while
preserving properties such as coherence, consistency and reliability. To support Compute
Cache operations without operand locality, we also study near-place processing in cache.
We re-designed several important applications (text processing, databases, checkpoint-
ing) to utilize Compute Cache operations. We demonstrate significant speedup (1.9×) and
energy savings (2.4×) compared to processors with conventional SIMD units. While our
savings for applications are limited by the fraction of their computation that can be ac-
celerated using Compute Caches (Amdahl’s law), our micro-benchmarks demonstrate that
applications with larger fraction of Compute Cache operations could benefit even more
(54× throughput, 9× dynamic energy savings).
1.2 InvisiMem: Smart Memory Defenses for Memory Bus Side Chan-
nel
While performance and energy benefits of NDP have been exploited before in alternate
ways, this dissertation also identifies security advantages that NDP can furnish. Privacy
concerns is one of the strongest impediment to wider adoption of cloud computing. An
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important security concern for trusted cloud computing is the memory bus side channel.
An attacker can learn sensitive information about an application by observing data and
addresses over the memory bus. While it has received much attention, a low-overhead
solution for it is still beyond reach.
Traditional solutions to fix this vulnerability employ the Oblivious RAM (ORAM) [60]
construct to hide leaking addresses over the bus. ORAM is a cryptographic construction
that obfuscates memory accesses and makes them indistinguishable from a random access
pattern. A secure processor can implement ORAM by issuing several memory accesses for
every ORAM access. Depending on the size of ORAM, an ORAM access may incur two to
three orders of magnitude increase in memory bandwidth and latency compared to a normal
DRAM access. In spite of recent advancements [111, 56, 93, 160], even with significant
custom hardware support [56], an ORAM-enabled secure processor increases memory ac-
cess latency by 20X, which can result in a performance overhead of about 4X. Beside
hiding addresses accessed, it is also paramount to hide memory access times, memory ad-
dress trace length and provide other security guarantees like data freshness. Providing these
additional guarantees only adds to existing severe ORAM overheads.
This dissertation observes that smart memory, memory with compute capability and
a packetized interface, can dramatically simplify this problem. Such smart memories are
possible today due to recent advancements in 3D integration technology such as the Hybrid
Memory Cube (HMC) [12] which make it possible to stack DRAM layers on top of logic
layers, and connect them using Through Silicon Via (TSV).
Our proposed solution InvisiMem expands the trust base to include the logic layer in
the smart memory to implement cryptographic primitives, which aid in addressing several
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memory bus side channel vulnerabilities efficiently. This allows the secure host processor
to send encrypted addresses over the untrusted memory bus, and thereby eliminates the
need for expensive address obfuscation techniques based on ORAM. Additional measures
are required for address confidentiality which we identify and implement efficiently. In ad-
dition to address confidentiality, we also discuss how smart memory helps mitigate memory
bus timing channel using constant heart-beat packets.
Furthermore, we also observe that smart memory can help reduce the overhead in-
curred for guaranteeing data freshness. An adversary tapping the memory bus can rollback
the state of a memory block by using older messages. To defeat such replay attacks, the
secure processor needs to maintain additional state (version numbers) to ensure that a read
response returns the latest version for a memory block ( [152, 56]). With compute capa-
bility in memory, InvisiMem establishes a secure channel of communication between the
secure processor and memory, such that it guarantees freshness without maintaining such
version numbers in the secure host processor.
We demonstrate that InvisiMem designs provide strong defenses against memory bus
side channels and efficient data freshness guarantee and have one to two orders of magni-
tude of lower overheads for performance, space, energy, and memory bandwidth, compared
to prior solutions.
1.3 Sanctuary: Secure and Efficient Memory Management
This dissertation also harnesses NDP to lower the overheads for page fault channel
defense. Current state of the art secure processors like Intel SGX (Software Guard Exten-
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sions) leave virtual memory management to the operating system. An untrusted operating
system can exploit this to induce page faults on every memory access by the application.
By doing this, a malicious OS can learn memory access trace of the application at page
granularity. A recent work [151] has demonstrated how an application’s page access pat-
tern obtained via page-fault side channel can be used to deduce the program path it took
during execution which in turn can help deduce the application’s sensitive inputs or outputs.
Specifically, they showed how the input image to an image processing application can be
completely recovered. This can have catastrophic consequences for privacy of confidential
data like medical images which are being processed by cloud services.
Current solutions to fix page fault channel [40] make the unrealistic assumption that all
memory needed by an application is reserved a priori. Predetermining application mem-
ory requirement is possible by either severely limiting application behavior (no dynamic
memory allocations, no recursion etc.) or by reserving large amounts of memory a priori.
The latter case can cause information leak if application memory requirement exceeds the
reserved memory size during runtime, leading to OS controlled paging activity. Finally, yet
importantly, these solutions rob the OS of it’s flexibility in managing memory as a resource;
once allocated, memory cannot be reclaimed.
To address the insufficiency of prior works, this dissertation presents Sanctuary, a novel
page fault channel defense which unlike prior solutions preserves operating system’s flex-
ibility in managing memory as a resource by allowing on-demand page allocations and
deallocations. We design a secure runtime which interfaces with the OS on behalf of the
application to hide addresses accessed by the application and also secures address transla-
tions for sensitive application pages. Our secure runtime uses a novel construct, Oblivious
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Page Management (OPAM) which is derived from Oblivious RAM construct [60] but is
customized for addressing challenges and exploiting opportunities that arise in the context
of page management. The chief source of OPAM overhead comprises of page moves and
we perform these page movements near-memory to lower their overheads. Finally, we also
propose a novel memory partition which helps reduce the OPAM transactions needed in
our system and further brings down the overheads of our solution. We study a suite of
cloud applications and show that page fault channel can be fixed at reasonable overheads.
1.4 Organization
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II presents some back-
ground material on near data processing. Chapter III presents Compute Caches which
enables computation in caches and delivers performance and energy wins. Chapter IV
presents InvisiMem, a secure processor which solves memory bus side channels efficiently
using 3D stacked memories. Chapter V discusses an efficient defense against page fault
channel vulnerability. Finally, in Chapter VI we conclude the dissertation by summarizing
our contributions.
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CHAPTER II
Background
In this chapter we look at prior work on Near Data Processing (NDP) paradigm to put
the research presented in this proposal in proper context. NDP is a data centric computa-
tion paradigm in which computation is moved to where data resides. Prior work on Near
Data Processing can be divided into two parts based on whether or not the proposals em-
ploy 3D Stacked DRAM. We first present prior work which does not employ such “smart”
memories. We then give a brief background on 3D stacked smart memory followed by
proposals which do employ them to harness performance and energy efficiency. Finally,
we talk about how the research presented in this proposal breaks new ground in both ex-
panding the reach of Near Data Processing and identifying its new advantages which have
been hitherto unexplored.
2.1 NDP proposals without 3D Stacked Memory
Traditional DRAM chips have abundant internal bandwidth thanks to large row buffers
but only a tiny amount of data per access is shipped to processor (cache block). To solve
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this, EXECUBE [86] augments a standard, low cost DRAM chip with logic array compris-
ing of eight processors and interface ports. Each such processor can either work indepen-
dently or in tandem with other processors in a SIMD fashion. Such processors then enjoy
far more memory bandwidth than traditional systems which connect to off-chip memory
via memory bus.
Terasys [58] transforms conventional memory into a SIMD processor array. In this
proposal, a traditional SRAM array can either support normal read/write mode or a spe-
cial PIM (processing in memory) mode. In PIM mode, processors associated with each
column in SRAM array perform a specific command on a selected row in SRAM array.
The processors present are bit serial that access and process bits from attached memory.
Each cycle, the processors can either load or store data and perform computation on data
using an ALU. Terasys also provides some reduction capabilities on the results produced
by these processors such as combining results of all processors to send a single bit result to
host processor.
IRAM [106] proposes unifying DRAM and logic into single DRAM chip in response
to growing processor-memory performance gap. Such an organization can utilize internal
DRAM bandwidth better as compared to traditional processor memory configuration. As
memory is now effectively on-chip, memory latency is lower. Furthermore, energy ex-
pended is lower too as far more memory is available on-chip than would be possible using
SRAM as DRAM is far denser.
Active Pages [102] proposes partitioning applications between traditional processor and
intelligent memory system such that data intensive parts of the application are carried out by
the memory. “Active pages” consists of a page of data and functions which manipulate the
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data. The memory system employed is capable of both storing the data and performing the
data manipulations. This proposal implements memory system managing “active pages”
using re-configurable architecture DRAM which integrates FPGA and DRAM technology.
FlexRAM [77] models memory flexibly as either default DRAM chip or a PIM (pro-
cessing in memory) chip which performs computation. This proposal models PIM chips
based on Merged Logic DRAM (MLD) process which integrates logic and DRAM in a sin-
gle chip. PIM chips consist of simple processing elements finely interleaved with DRAM
cells which have high bandwidth access to memory. A low-issue superscalar RISC core
is also modeled in each PIM chip to co-ordinate the processing of the simple processing
elements without relying on host processor.
DIVA [49] or Data IntensiVe Architecture models PIM chips (memory with processing
logic) as co-processors for a conventional system which can either be used to perform
computation close to memory or be used as traditional DRAM chips. Each DIVA PIM
chip is a memory device augmented with a processor and communication hardware for
PIM chips to interact with each other. Form of active messages called “parcels” are used
to communicate computation and synchronize PIM chips. DIVA memory is partitioned
between that accessible to host processor only, PIM chips only and global memory that is
accessible to both. DIVA also enables light weight address translations on PIM chips using
segments.
While all prior proposals aim to add logic to memory to support general purpose pro-
grams, Intelligent Memory Manager [112] augments memory with a simple processor
which solely aims to aid the host processor by performing memory management func-
tions (prefetching of data, relocation of data) on its behalf. Such functions typically tend to
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pollute processor caches. By performing them using processor in memory, such pollution
can be avoided.
2.2 3D Stacked Memory
Advancements in 3D integration have made possible 3D Stacked memories which are
now commercially available [16]. A typical 3D Stacked memory consists of several layers
of DRAM dies stacked on top of each other, with a logic layer at the bottom. The DRAM
banks are organized into sets of independent vaults, and the various layers are connected
using Through Silicon Vias (TSVs) [12]. High density, short length TSVs in conjunction
with vaults which function independently and can be accessed in parallel are the chief
sources of high bandwidth provided by such a system.
Two of the most popular 3D stacked designs present are HMC [12] and HBM [83].
Both of them employ multiple memory dies stacked together with a logic die at the base.
HMC places memory controller logic in the logic die. While their internal implementations
differ, most importantly, how they are integrated with the main host processor also differs.
In case of HMC an high speed packet based serial interface connects it to the CPU. In case
of HBM however, interaction with CPU is achieved using another silicon layer, termed
silicon interposer.
2.2.1 NDP proposals with 3D Stacked Memory
Several proposals employ such 3D Stacked memories to harness performance for var-
ious applications. Pugsleyet al. [109] model several simple processing cores in the logic
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layer of 3D Stacked memory which perform the Map operation to accelerate MapReduce
workloads. In TOP-PIM [159], the authors model GPU in logic layer of 3D Stacked mem-
ory and study several GPGPU workloads to identify characteristics that make workloads
amenable to be offloaded to GPU near memory. Ahn et al. [22] proposed a locality aware
PIM design, which opportunistically decides when computation should be offloaded to
memory and when it should be performed using host processor instructions.
2.3 Breaking New Ground in NDP
All prior proposals augment the main memory to play an active part in computation.
For applications with no cache locality, compute capable memory is clearly an effective
solution. But for cache friendly applications, always computing in memory may not be an
efficient choice. However, the other extreme of computing the traditional way, as this pro-
posal shows, incurs high instruction processing overheads and expends significant energy
for moving data over memory hierarchy.
To address these limitations, this proposal introduces a new way to realize near-data
computing by enabling processor caches to perform computation. Using our proposed
solution, caches can perform simple operations common to wide variety of applications.
Using our system, data can be moved to the cache level most suitable to it’s reuse profile.
Most near-data processing proposals presented in this chapter seek to attain perfor-
mance and energy gains. Our proposal also identifies and exploits an hitherto untapped
advantage of NDP to provide low-overhead security guarantees.
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CHAPTER III
Compute Caches: Caches that Compute
This chapter presents Compute Caches, our novel proposal to enable computations in
processor caches. With Compute Caches we add a new technique to exploit the near data
processing paradigm. Compute centric architectures employ processor caches merely to
stage data and they otherwise play no active role in computation. However, with Compute
Caches, processor caches can now play an active and a powerful role in computation. Com-
pute Caches not only provide advantages of vector processing but also help avoid excessive
data movement over memory hierarchy.
3.1 Introduction
As computing today is dominated by data-centric applications, there is a strong impetus
for specialization for this important domain. Conventional processors’ narrow vector units
fail to exploit the high degree of data-parallelism in these applications. Also, they expend
disproportionately large fraction of time and energy in moving data over cache hierarchy,
and in instruction processing, as compared to the actual computation [41].
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We present the Compute Cache architecture for dramatically reducing these inefficien-
cies through in-place (in-situ) processing in caches. A modern processor devotes a large
fraction (40-60%) of die area to caches which are used for storing and retrieving data. Our
key idea is to re-purpose and transform the elements used in caches into active computa-
tional units. This enables computation in-place within a cache sub-array, without transfer-
ring data in or out of it. Such a transformation can unlock massive data-parallel compute
capabilities, dramatically reduce energy spent in data movement over the cache hierarchy,
and thereby directly address the needs of data-centric applications.
Our proposed architecture uses an emerging SRAM circuit technology, which we refer
to as bit-line computing [73, 76]. By simultaneously activating multiple word-lines, and
sensing the resulting voltage over the shared bit-lines, several important operations over
the data stored in the activated bit-cells can be accomplished without data corruption. A
recently fabricated chip [73] demonstrates feasibility of bit-line computing. They also
show a stability of more than six sigma robustness for Monte Carlo simulations, which
is considered industry standard for robustness against process variations.
Past processing-in-memory (PIM) solutions proposed to move processing logic near
the cache [87, 50] or main memory [107, 126]. 3D stacking can make this possible [22].
Compute Caches significantly push the envelope by enabling in-place processing using
existing cache elements. It is an effective optimization for data-centric applications, where
at least one of the operands (e.g., dictionary in WordCount) used in computation has cache
locality.
Efficiency of Compute Caches arises from two main sources: massive parallelism and
reduced data movement. A cache is typically organized as a set of sub-arrays; as many
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as hundreds of sub-arrays, depending on the cache level. These sub-arrays can potentially
compute concurrently on data stored in them (KBs of data) with little extensions to the ex-
isting cache structures (8% of cache area overhead). Thus, caches can effectively function
as large vector computational units, whose operand sizes are orders of magnitude larger
than conventional SIMD units (KBs vs bytes). To achieve similar capability, the logic
close to memory in a conventional PIM solution would need to provision more than hun-
dred additional vector functional units. The second benefit of Compute Caches is that they
avoid the energy and performance cost incurred not only for transferring data between the
cores and different levels of cache hierarchy (through network-on-chip), but even between
a cache’s sub-array to its controller (through in-cache interconnect).
We address several problems in realizing the Compute Cache architecture, discuss ISA
and system software extensions, and re-designs several data-centric applications to take
advantage of the new processing capability.
An important problem in using Compute Caches is satisfying the operand locality con-
straint. Bit-line computing requires that the data operands are stored in rows that share the
same set of bit-lines. We architect a cache geometry, where ways in a set are judiciously
mapped to a sub-array, so that software can easily satisfy operand locality. Our design al-
lows a compiler to ensure operand locality simply by placing operands at addresses that are
page aligned (same page offset). It avoids exposing the internals of a cache, such as its size
or geometry, to software.
When in-place processing is not possible for an operation due to lack of operand lo-
cality, we propose to use near-place Compute Caches. In near-place design, the source
operands are read out from the cache sub-arrays, the operation is performed in a logic unit
16
placed close to the cache controller, and the result may be written back to the cache.
Besides operand locality, Compute Caches brings forth several interesting questions.
How to orchestrate concurrent computation over operands spreading across multiple cache
sub-arrays? How to ensure coherence between compute-enabled caches? How to ensure
consistency model constraints when computation is spread between cores and caches? Soft
errors are a significant concern in modern processors. Can Error Correction Codes (ECC)
be used for Compute Caches? When not possible, what are the alternative solutions? We
discuss relatively simple solutions to address these problems.
Compute Caches support several in-place vector operations: copy, search, compare and
logical operations (and, or, xor, and not) which can accelerate a wide variety of applica-
tions. We study two text processing applications (word count, string matching), database
query processing with bitmap indexing, copy-on-write checkpointing in OS, and bit matrix
multiplication (BMM); a critical primitive used in cryptography, bioinformatics, and image
processing. We re-designed these applications to efficiently represent their computation in
terms of Compute Cache supported vector operations. Section 3.5 identifies a number of
additional domains that can benefit from Compute Caches: data analytics, search, network
processing etc.
We evaluate the merits of Compute Caches for a multi-core processor modeled after
Intel’s SandyBridge [88] processor with eight cores, three levels of caches, and a ring inter-
connect. For the applications we study, on average, Compute Caches improve performance
by 1.9× and reduce energy by 2.4× compared to a conventional processor with 32-byte
wide vector units. Applications with a higher fraction of Compute Cache operations can
benefit significantly more. Through micro-benchmarks that manipulate 4KB operands, we
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Figure 3.1: Compute Cache overview. (a) Cache hierarchy. (b) Cache geometry (c) In-
place compute in a sub-array.
show that Compute Caches provide 9× dynamic energy savings over a baseline using 32-
byte SIMD units while providing 54× better throughput on average.
3.2 Background
This section provides a brief background of cache hierarchy, cache geometry, and bit-
line computing in SRAM.
3.2.1 Cache Hierarchy and Geometry
Figure 3.1 (a) illustrates a multi-core processor modeled loosely after Intel’s Sandy-
bridge [88]. It has a three-level cache hierarchy comprising of private L1 and L2, and a
shared L3. The shared L3 cache is distributed into slices which are connected to the cores
via a shared ring interconnect. A cache consists of a cache controller and several banks
((Figure 3.1 (b)). Each bank has several sub-arrays connected by a H-Tree interconnect.
For example, a 2 MB L3 cache slice has a total of 64 sub-arrays distributed across 16 banks.
A sub-array in a cache bank is organized into multiple rows of data-storing bit-cells.
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Figure 3.2: SRAM circuit for in-place operations. Two rows (WLi and WLj) are activated.
An AND operation is performed by sensing bit-line (BL). All the bit-lines are initially pre-
charged to ‘1’. If both the activated bits in a column have a ‘1’ (column ‘n’), then the BL
stays high and it is sensed as a ‘1’. If any one of the bits were ‘0’ it will lower the BL
voltage below Vref and will be sensed as a ‘0’. A NOR operation can be performed by
sensing bit-line bar (BLB).
The bit-cells in the same row are connected to a word-line. The bit-cells along a column
share the same bit-line. Typically, in any cycle, one word-line is activated, from where a
data block is either read from, or written to, through the column bit-lines.
3.2.2 Bit-line Computing
Compute Caches use emerging bit-line computing technology in SRAMs [73, 76] (Fig-
ure 3.2) which observes that, when multiple word-lines are activated simultaneously, the
shared bit-lines can be sensed to produce the result of and and nor on the data stored in
the two activated rows. Data corruption due to multi-row access is prevented by lower-
ing word-line voltage to bias against write of the SRAM array. Jeloka et al. [73]’s mea-
surements across 20 fabricated test chips demonstrate that data-corruption does not occur
even when 64 word-lines are simultaneously activated during such an in-place computa-
tion. They show a stability of more than six sigma robustness for Monte Carlo simulations,
which is considered industry standard for robustness against process variations. Also, note
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that, by lowering the word-line voltage further, robustness can be improved at the cost of
increase in delay. Even with it, Compute Caches will still deliver significant savings given
its potential (Section 3.6, 54× throughput, 9× dynamic energy savings).
Section 3.4.2 discusses our extensions to bit-line computing enabled SRAM to support
additional operations: copy, xor, equality comparison, search, and carryless multiplica-
tion (clmul).
3.3 A Case for Compute Caches
In-place Compute Cache has the potential to provide massive data-parallelism, while
also dramatically reducing the instruction processing and on-chip data movement over-
heads. Figure 3.3 pictorially depicts these benefits by comparing a scalar core, a SIMD
core with vector processing support, and Compute Caches.
The bottom half in Figure 3.3 depicts the area proportioning and processing capability
of the three architectures. Significant fraction of die area in a conventional processor is for
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Cache cache-ic (h-tree) cache-access
L1-D 179 pJ 116 pJ
L2 675 pJ 127 pJ
L3-slice 1985 pJ 467 pJ
Table 3.1: Cache energy per read access
caches. A Compute Cache re-purposes the elements used in this large area into compute
units for a small area overhead (8% of cache area). A typical last-level cache consists of
hundreds of sub-arrays distributed across different banks which can potentially compute
concurrently on cache blocks stored in them. This enables us to exploit large scale data
level parallelism (e.g. a 16MB L3 has 512 sub-arrays and can support 8 KB operands)
dwarfing even a SIMD core.
The top row of Figure 3.3 shows relative energy consumption for a comparison op-
eration over several blocks of 4KB operands (Section 3.6.4). In a scalar core, less than
1% of the energy is expended on the ALU operation, while nearly three quarters of the
energy is spent in processing instructions in the core, and one-fourth is spent on data move-
ment. While vector processing (SIMD) support (Figure 3.3 (b)) in general-purpose and
data-parallel accelerators reduce the instruction processing overhead to some degree, it
does not help address the data movement overhead. Compute Cache architecture (Fig-
ure 3.3 (c)) can reduce the instruction processing overheads by an order of magnitude, by
supporting SIMD operation on large operands (tens of KB). Also, it avoids the energy and
performance cost due to data movement.
In-place Compute Cache reduces on-chip data movement overhead, which consists of
two components. First, is the energy spent on data transfer. This includes not only the
significant energy spent on the processor interconnect’s wires and routers, but also the
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H-Tree interconnect used for data transfer within a cache. A near-place Compute Cache
solution can solve the former but not the latter. As shown in Table 3.1, H-Tree consumes
nearly 80% of cache energy spent in reading from a 2MB L3 cache slice.
Second, is the energy spent when reading and writing in the higher-level caches. In a
conventional processor, a data block trickles up the cache hierarchy all the way from L3
to L1 cache, and into a core’s registers, before it can be operated upon. An L3 Compute
Cache can eliminate all this overhead. A shared L3 Compute Cache can also reduce the
cost of sharing data between two cores, as it would avoid write-back from a source core’s
L1 to shared L3, and then a transfer back to a destination core’s L1.
3.4 Compute Cache Architecture
Figure 3.1 illustrates the Compute Cache (CC) architecture. We enhance all the levels
in the cache hierarchy with in-place compute capability. Computation is done at the highest
level where the application exhibits significant locality. In-place compute is based on the
bit-line computing technology we discussed in Section 3.2. We enhance these basic in-
place compute capabilities to support xor and several in-place operations (copy, search,
comparison, and carryless multiplication).
In-place computing is possible only when operands are mapped to sub-arrays such that
they share the same bit-lines. We refer to this requirement as operand locality. We discuss
a cache geometry that allows a compiler to satisfy operand locality by ensuring that the
operands are page-aligned.
Each cache controller is extended to manage the parallel execution of CC instructions
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Opcode Src1 Src2 Dest Size Description
cc copy a - b n b[i] = a[i]
cc buz a - - n a[i] = 0
cc cmp a b r n r[i] = (a[i] == b[i])
cc search a k r n r[i] = (a[i] == k)
cc and a b c n c[i] = a[i] & b[i]
cc or a b c n c[i] = (a[i] || b[i])
cc xor a b c n c[i] = a[i]⊕ b[i]
cc clmulX a k c n ci = ⊕(a[i] & k)
cc not a - b n b[i] =!(a[i])
a,b,c,k: addresses r:register ∀i, i ∈ [1, n] , X = [ 64/128/256 ]
Table 3.2: Compute Cache ISA.
across its several banks. It also decides the cache level to perform the computation and
fetches the operands to that level. Given that a Compute Cache can modify data, we discuss
its implication in ensuring coherence and consistency properties. Finally, we discuss design
alternatives for supporting ECC in Compute Caches.
In the absence of operand locality, we propose to compute near-place in cache. For
this, we add a Logic Unit in the cache controller. Although near-place cache computing
requires additional functional units, and cannot save H-Tree interconnect energy inside
caches, it successfully helps reduce the energy spent in transferring and storing data in the
higher-level caches.
3.4.1 Instruction Set Architecture (ISA)
Compute Cache (CC) ISA extensions are listed in Table 3.2. It supports several vector
instructions, whose operands are specified using register indirect addressing. Operand sizes
are specified through immediate values and can be as large as 16K. It supports vector copy-
ing, zeroing, and logical operations. It also supports vector carry less multiply instruction
(cc clmul) at single/double/quad word granularity. It also supports equality comparison
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and search. We limit the operand size (n) of these instructions to 64 words (512 bytes),
so that the result can be returned as a 64-bit value to a processor core’s register. For the
search instruction, the key size is set to 64 bytes. For smaller keys, the programmer can
either duplicate the key multiple times starting from the key’s address (if its size is a word
multiple), or pad the key and source data operands to be 64 bytes.
3.4.2 Cache Sub-arrays with In-Place Compute
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Figure 3.4: In-place copy operation (from row i to j).
Compute Caches is made possible by our SRAM sub-array design that facilitates in-
place computation. We start with the basic circuit framework proposed by Jeloka et al. [73],
which supports logical and and nor operations. To a conventional cache’s sub-array, we
add an additional decoder to allow activating two wordlines, one for each operand. The two
single-ended sense amplifiers required for separately sensing both the bit-lines attached to
a bit-cell are obtained by re-configuring the original differential sense amplifier.
In addition to and and nor operations, we extend the circuit to support xor operation
by NOR-ing bit-line and bit-line complement. We realize compound operations such as
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compare and search by using the results of bitwise xor. To compare two words, the
individual bit-wise xor results are combined using a wired-NOR. Comparison is utilized
to do iterative search over cache blocks stored in sub-arrays.
By feeding the result of the sense-amplifiers back to the bit-lines, one word-line can be
copied to another without ever latching the source operand. We leverage the fact that the
last read value is same as the data to be written in the next cycle, and coalesce the read-
write operation to enable more energy-efficient copy operation as shown in Figure 3.4. By
resetting input data latch before a write we can enable in-place zeroing of a cache block.
Finally, the carryless multiplication (clmul) operation is done using a logical and on
two sub-array rows, followed by xor reduction of all the resultant bits. This is supported
by adding a xor reduction tree to each sub-array.
Our extensions have negligible impact on the baseline read/write accesses as they use
the same circuit as the baseline, including differential sensing. An in-place operation takes
longer than a single read or write sub-array access, as it requires longer word-line pulse to
activate and sense two rows to compensate for the lower word-line voltage. Sensing time
also increases due to the use of single-ended sense amplifiers, as opposed to differential
sensing. However, note that this is still less than the delay baseline would incur to accom-
plish an equivalent in-place operation, as it would require multiple read accesses and/or
write access. Section 3.6.3 provides the detailed delay, energy and area parameters for
compute capable cache sub-arrays.
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3.4.3 Operand Locality
For in-place operations, the operands need to be physically stored in a sub-array, such
that they share the same set of bitlines. We term this requirement as operand locality.
In this section, we discuss cache organization and software constraints that can together
satisfy this property. Fortunately, we find that software can ensure operand locality as long
as operands are page-aligned, i.e., have the same page offset. Besides this, the programmer
or the compiler does not need to know about any other specifics of the cache geometry.
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Figure 3.5: Cache organization example, address decoding ([i][j] = set i, way j), alternate
address decoding for parallel tag-data access caches
Operand locality aware cache organization: Figure 3.5 illustrates a simple cache
with one bank each with four sub-arrays. Rows in a sub-array share the same set of bitlines.
We define a new term, Block Partition (BP). Block partition for a sub-array is the group
of cache blocks in that sub-array that share the same bitlines. In-place operation is possible
between any two cache blocks stored within a block partition. In our example, since each
row in a sub-array has two cache blocks, there are two block partitions per sub-array. In
26
total, there are eight block partitions (BP0-BP7). In-place compute is possible between any
blocks that map to the same block partition ( e.g. blocks in sets S0 and S2).
We make two design choices for our cache organization to simplify operand locality
constraint. First, all the ways in a set are mapped to the same block partition as shown in
Figure 3.5(a). This ensures that operand locality would not be affected based on which way
is chosen for a cache block.
Second, we use a portion of set-index bits to select the block’s bank and block parti-
tion, as shown in Figure 3.5(b). As long as these are the same for two operands, they are
guaranteed to be mapped to the same block partition.
Software requirement: The number of address bits that must match for operand lo-
cality varies based on the cache size. As shown in Table 3.3, even the largest cache (L3) in
our model requires that only least 12 bits are the same for two operands (we assume pages
are mapped to a NUCA slice closest to the core actively accessing them). Given that our
pages are 4KB in size, we observe that as long as the operands are page aligned, i.e., have
the same page offset, then they will be placed in the address space such that the least sig-
nificant bits (12 for 4 KB page) in their addresses (both virtual and physical) match. This
would trivially satisfy the operand locality requirement for all the cache levels and sizes we
study. Note that, we only require operands to be placed at the same offset of 4KB mem-
ory regions, and it is not necessary to place them in separate pages. For super-pages that
are larger than 4KB, operands can be placed within a page while ensuring 12-bit address
alignment.
We expect that for data-intensive regular applications that operate on large chunks of
data, it is possible to satisfy this property. Many operating system operations that involve
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Cache Banks BP Block size Min. address bits match
L1-D 2 2 64 8
L2 8 2 64 10
L3-slice 16 4 64 12
Table 3.3: Cache geometry and operand locality constraint.
copying from one page to another are guaranteed to exhibit operand locality for our system.
Compiler and dynamic memory allocators could be extended to optimize for this property
in future.
Finally, a binary compiled with a given address bit alignment requirement (12 bits in
our work) is portable across a wide range of cache architectures as long as the number of
address bits to be aligned is equal to or less than what they were compiled for. If the cache
geometry changes such that it requires greater alignment, then the programs would have to
be recompiled to satisfy that stricter constraint.
Column Multiplexing: With column multiplexing, multiple adjacent bit-lines are mul-
tiplexed to a single bit data output, which is then observed using one sense-amplifier. This
keeps area overhead of peripherals under check and improves resilience to particle strikes.
Fortunately, in column multiplexed sub-arrays, adjacent bits in a cache block are inter-
leaved across different sub-arrays such that their bitlines are not multiplexed. In this case,
the logical block partition that we defined would be interleaved across the sub-arrays. Thus,
an entire cache block can be accessed in parallel. Given this, in-place concurrent operation
on all the bits in a cache block is possible even with column multiplexing.
Our design choice of placing ways of a set within a block partition does not affect the
degree of column multiplexing as we interleave cache blocks of different sets instead.
Way Mapping vs Parallel Tag-Data Access: We chose to place all the ways of a set
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within a block partition, so that operand locality is not dependent on which way is chosen
for a block at runtime. However, this prevents us from supporting parallel tag-data access,
where all the cache blocks in a set are pro-actively read in parallel with the tag match.
This optimization is typically used for L1 as it can reduce the read latency by overlapping
tag match with read. But it incurs a high read energy overhead (4.7× higher energy per
access for L1 cache) for modest performance gain (2.5% for SPLASH-2[147]). Given the
significant benefits of L1 Compute Cache, we think it is a worthy trade-off to forgo this
optimization for L1.
3.4.4 Managing Parallelism
Cache controllers are extended to provision for CC controllers which orchestrate the
execution of CC instructions. The CC controller breaks a CC instruction into multiple
simple vector operations whose operands span at most a single cache block and issues them
to the sub-arrays. Since a typical cache hierarchy can have hundreds of sub-arrays (16MB
L3 cache has 512 sub-arrays), we can potentially issue hundreds of concurrent operations.
This is only limited by two factors. First, the bandwidth of the shared interconnects used
to transmit address/commands. Note that we do not replicate the address bus in our H-tree
interconnects. Second, number of sub-arrays activated at same time can be limited to limit
peak power drawn.
The controller at L1-cache uses an instruction table to keep track of the pend-
ing CC instructions. The simple vector operations are kept track of in the operation
table. The instruction table tracks metadata associated at instruction level (i.e., result,
count of simple vector operations completed, next simple vector operation to be gener-
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ated). The operation table, on other hand, tracks status of each operand associated with
the operation and issues request to fetch the operand if it is not present in the cache (Sec-
tion 3.4.5). When all operands are in cache, we issue the operation to the cache sub-array.
As operations complete they update the instruction table, and the L1-cache controller noti-
fies the core when an instruction is complete.
To support search instruction, CC controller replicates key in all the block partitions
where the source data resides. To avoid doing this again for the same instruction, we track
such replications per instruction in a key table.
Finally, if the address range of any operand of a CC instruction spans multiple pages,
it raises a pipeline exception. The exception handler splits the instruction into multiple CC
operations such that each of its operands are within a page.
3.4.5 Fetching In-Place Operands
The Compute Cache (CC) controllers are responsible for deciding the level in the cache
hierarchy where CC operations need to be performed, and issuing commands to the cache
sub-array to execute them. To simplify our design, in our study, the CC controller always
performs the operations at the highest-level cache where all the operands are present. If
any of the operands are not cached, then the operation is performed at lowest-level cache
(L3). Cache allocation policy can be improved in future by enhancing our CC controller
with a cache block reuse predictor [70].
Once a cache level is picked, CC controller fetches any missing operands to that level.
The controller also pins the cache-lines the operands are fetched in while the CC operation
is under way. To avoid the eviction of operands while waiting for missing operands, we
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Figure 3.6: Compute Caches in action
promote the cache blocks of that operand to the MRU position in the LRU chain. However,
on receiving a forwarded coherence request, we release the lock to avoid deadlock and re-
fetch the operand. Getting a forwarded request to a locked cache line will be rare for two
reasons. First, in DRF [20] compliant programs, only one thread will be able to operate
on a cache block while holding its software lock. Second, as operands of a single CC
operation are cache block wide, false sharing will be low. Nevertheless, to avoid starvation
in pathological scenarios, if CC operation fails to get permission after repeated attempts
(set to two), processor core will translate and execute a CC operation as RISC operations.
Figure 3.6 shows a working example. Core issues operation cc and with address
operands A, B and C to L1 controller ( 1 ). Each is of size 64 bytes (8 words) spanning an
entire cache block. For clarity, only one cache set in each cache level is shown. None of
the operands are present in L1 cache. Operand B is in L2 cache and is dirty. L3 cache has
31
clean copy of A and a stale copy of B. C is not in any cache.
L3 cache is chosen for the CC operation, as it is the highest cache level where all
operands are present. L1 and L2 controllers will forward this operation to L3 ( 2 , 3 ).
Before doing so, L2 cache will first write-back B to L3. Note that caches already write-
back dirty data to next cache level on eviction and we use this existing mechanism.
On receiving the command, L3 fetches C from memory ( 4 ). Note that, as an optimiza-
tion, C need not be fetched from memory as it will be over-written entirely. Once all the
operands are ready, L3 performs the CC operation ( 5 ) and subsequently notifies the L1
controller ( 6 ) of it’s completion, which in turn notifies the core ( 7 ).
3.4.6 Cache Coherence
Compute Cache optimization interacts with the cache coherence protocol minimally
and as a result does not introduce any new race conditions. As discussed above, while
the controller locks cache lines while performing CC operation, on receipt of a forwarded
coherence request, the controller releases the lock and responds to the request. Thus, a
forwarded coherence request is always responded to in cases where it would be responded
to in the baseline design.
Typically, higher-level caches writeback dirty data to the next-level cache on evictions.
Coherence protocols already support such writebacks. In the Compute Cache architecture,
when a cache level is skipped to perform CC operations, any dirty operands in the skipped
level need to be written back to next level of cache to ensure correctness. To do this, we use
the existing writeback mechanism and thus require no change to the underlying coherence
protocol.
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3.4.7 Consistency Model Implications
Current language consistency models (C++ and Java) are variants of the DRF model [20],
and therefore a processor only needs to adhere to the RMO memory model. While ISAs
providing stronger guarantees (x86) exist, they can be exploited only by writing assem-
bly programs. As a consequence, while we believe stronger memory model guarantees
for Compute Caches is an interesting problem (to be explored in future work), we assume
RMO model in our design. In RMO, no memory ordering is needed between data reads and
writes, including all CC operations. Individual operations within a vector CC instruction
can also be performed in parallel by the CC controller.
Programmers use fence instructions to order memory operations, which is sufficient
in the presence of CC instructions. Processor stalls commit of a fence operation until pre-
ceding pending operations are completed, including CC operations. Similar to conventional
vector instructions, it is not possible to specify a fence between scalar operations within a
single vector CC instruction.
3.4.8 Memory Disambiguation and Store Coalescing
Similar to SIMD instructions, Compute Cache (CC) vector instructions require addi-
tional support in the processor core for memory ordering. We classify instructions in CC
ISA into two types. CC-R type (cc cmp, cc search) only read from memory. The rest
of the instructions are CC-RW type as they both read and write from memory. Under RMO
memory model, CC-R can be executed out-of-order, whereas CC-RW behaves like a store.
In the following discussion, we refer to CC-R as load, and CC-RW as store.
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Conventional processor cores use a load-store queue (LSQ) to check for address con-
flicts between a load and the preceding uncommitted stores. As vector instructions can
access more than a word, it is necessary to enhance the LSQ with the support for checking
address ranges, instead of just one address. For this reason, we use a dedicated vector LSQ,
where each entry has additional space to keep track of address ranges for the operands of a
vector instruction.
Similar to LSQ, we also split the store buffer into two, one for scalar stores and an-
other for vector stores. The vector store buffer supports address range checks (max 12
comparisons/entry). Our scalar store buffer permits coalescing. However, it is not possible
to coalesce CC-RW instructions with any store, because their output is not known till they
are performed in a cache. As the vector store buffer is non-coalescing, it is possible for
the two store buffers to contain stores to the same location. If such a scenario is detected,
the conflicting store is stalled until the preceding store is complete which ensures program
order between stores to the same location. We augment the store buffer with a field which
points to any successor store and a stall bit. The stall bit is reset when the predecessor store
completes.
Data values are not forwarded from vector stores to any loads, or from any store to
a vector load. Code segments where both vector and scalar operations access the same
location within a short time span is likely to be rare. If such a code segment is frequently
executed, the compiler can choose to not employ Compute Cache optimization.
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3.4.9 Error Detection and Correction
Systems with strong reliability requirements employ Error Correction Codes (ECC) for
caches. ECC protection for conventional and near-place operations are unaffected in our
design. For cc copy simply copying ECC from source to destination suffices. For cc buz,
ECC of zeroed blocks can be updated. For comparison and search, ECC check can be
performed by comparing the ECCs of the source operands. An error is detected if data bits
match, but the ECC bits don’t, or vice versa.
For in-place logical operations (cc and, cc or, cc xor, cc clmul, and cc not), it is chal-
lenging to perform the check and compute the ECC for the result. We propose two alter-
natives. One alternative is to read out the xor of the two operands and their ECCs, and
check the integrity at the ECC logic unit (ECC(A xor B) = ECC(A) xor ECC(B)).
This unit also computes the ECC of the result. Our sub-array design permits computing the
xor operation alongside any logical operation. Although the logical operation is still done
in-place, this method will incur extra data transfers to and from the ECC logic unit. Cache
scrubbing during cache idle cycles [122] is a more attractive option. Since soft errors in
caches are infrequent (0.7 to 7 errors/year [146]), periodic scrubbing can be effective while
keeping performance and energy overheads low.
3.4.10 Near-Place Compute Caches
In the absence of operand locality, we propose to compute instructions “near” the cache.
Our controller is provisioned with additional logic units (not arithmetic units) and registers
to temporarily store the operands. The source operands are read from the cache sub-array
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into the registers at the controller, and then computed results are written back to the cache.
In-place computation has two benefits over near-place computation. First, it provides mas-
sive compute capability for almost no additional area overhead. For example, a 16 MB
L3 with 512 sub-arrays allows 8KB of data to be computed in parallel. To support equiv-
alent computational capability, we would need 128 vector ALUs, each of width 64-bytes.
This is not a trivial overhead. We assume one vector logic unit per cache controller in our
near-cache design. Second, in-place compute avoids data transfer over H-Tree wires. This
reduces in-place compute latency (14 cycles) compared to near-cache (22 cycles). Also,
60%-80% of total cache read energy is due to H-Tree wire transfer (See Table 3.1), which
is eliminated with in-cache computation. Nevertheless, near cache computing retains the
other benefits of Compute Caches, by avoiding transferring data to the higher-level caches
and the core.
3.5 Applications
Our Compute Cache design supports simple but common operations, which can be
utilized to accelerate diverse set of data intensive applications.
Search and Compare Operations: Compare and search are common operations in
many emerging applications, especially text processing. Intel recently added seven new in-
structions to the x86 SSE 4.2 vector support that efficiently perform character searches and
comparison [15]. The Compute Cache architecture can significantly improve the efficiency
of these instructions. Similar to specialized CAM accelerators [64], our search functional-
ity can be utilized to speed up applications such as, search engines, decision tree training
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and compression and encoding schemes.
Logical Operations: Compute Cache logical operations can speedup processing of
commonly used bit manipulation primitives such as bitmaps. Bitmaps are used in graph and
database indexing/query processing. Query processing on databases with bitmap indexing
requires logical operation on large bitmaps. Compute Caches can also accelerate binary
bit matrix multiplication (BMM) which has uses in numerous applications such as error
correcting codes, cryptography, bioinformatics, and Fast Fourier Transform (FFT). Given
its importance, it was implemented as a dedicated instruction in Cray supercomputers [8]
and Intel processors provision a x86 carryless multiply (clmul) instruction to speed it.
Inherent cache locality in matrix multiplication makes BMM suitable for Compute Caches.
Further, our large vector operations can allow BMM to scale to large matrices.
Copy Operation: Prior research [126] makes a strong case for optimizing copy per-
formance which is a common operation in many applications in system software and ware-
house scale computing [75]. The operating system spends a considerable chunk of its
time (more than 50%) copying bulk data [28]. For instance copying is necessary for fre-
quently used system calls like fork, inter-process communication, virtual machine cloning
and deduplication, file system and network management. Our copy operation can acceler-
ate checkpointing, which has a wide range of uses, including fault tolerance and time-travel
debugging. Finally, our copy primitive can also be employed in bulk zeroing which is an
important primitive required for memory safety [154].
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Configuration 8 core CMP
Processor 2.66 GHz out-of-order core, 48 entry LQ, 32 entry SQ
L1-I Cache 32KB, 4-way, 5 cycle access
L1-D Cache 32KB, 8-way, 5 cycle access
L2 Cache inclusive, private, 256KB, 8-way,11 cycle access
L3 Cache inclusive, shared, 8 NUCA slices, 2MB each, 16-way, 11 cycle +
queuing delay
Interconnect ring, 3 cycle hop latency, 256-bit link width
Coherence directory based, MESI
Memory 120 cycle latency
Table 3.4: Simulator parameters
3.6 Evaluation
In this section we demonstrate the efficacy of Compute Caches (CC) using both micro-
benchmark study and a suite of data-intensive applications.
3.6.1 Simulation Methodology
We model a multi-core processor using SniperSim [29], a Pin-based simulator per Ta-
ble 3.4. We use McPAT [90] to model power consumption in both cores and caches.
3.6.2 Application Customization and Setup
In this section we describe how we redesigned applications in our study to utilize CC
instructions.
WordCount: WordCount [157] reads a text file (10MB) and builds a dictionary of
unique words and their frequency of appearance in the file. While the baseline does a
binary search over the dictionary to check if a new word is found, we model the dictionary
as alphabet indexed (first two letters of word) CAM (1KB each). As the dictionary is large
(719KB) we perform search operations in L3 cache. CC search instruction returns a bit
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vector indicating match/mismatch for multiple words and hence we also model additional
mask instructions which report match/mismatch per word.
StringMatch: StringMatch [157] reads words from a text file (50MB), encrypts them
and compares them to a list of encrypted keys. Encryption cannot be offloaded to cache,
hence, encrypted words are present in L1-cache and we perform CC search in it. By repli-
cating an encrypted key across all sub-arrays in L1, a single search instruction can compare
it against multiple encrypted words. Similar to WordCount we also model mask instruc-
tions.
DB-BitMap: We also model FastBit [2] a bitmap index library. The input database
index is created using data sets obtained from a real physics experiment, STAR [7]. A
sample query performs logical OR or AND of large bitmap bins (several 100 KBs each).
We modify the query to use cc or operations ( each processes 2KB of data). We measure
average query processing time for a sample query mix running over uncompressed bitmap
indexes.
BMM: Our optimized baseline BMM implementation (Section 3.5) uses blocking and
x86 CLMUL instructions. Given the reuse of matrix we perform cc clmul in L1-cache.
We model 256× 256 bit matrices.
Checkpointing: We model in-memory copy-on-write checkpointing support at page
granularity for SPLASH-2 [147] benchmark suite (checkpointing interval of 100,000 ap-
plication instructions).
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3.6.3 Compute Sub-Array: Delay and Area Impact
Compute Caches have negligible impact on the baseline read/write accesses as we still
support differential sensing. To get delay and energy estimates, we perform SPICE simula-
tions on a 28nm SOI CMOS process based sub-array, using standard foundry 6T bit-cells. 1
A and/or/xor 64-byte in-place operation is 3× longer as compared to single sub-array ac-
cess while rest of CC operations are 2× longer. In terms of energy, cmp/search/clmul
are 1.5×, copy/buz/not are 2×, and the rest are 2.5× baseline sub-array access. The area
overhead is 8% for a sub-array of size 512 × 512 2. Note, our estimates account for tech-
nology variations and process, voltage and temperature changes. Further, these estimates
are conservative when compared to measurements on silicon [73] in order to provision for
robust margin against read disturbs and to account for circuit parameter variation across
technology nodes.
We use the above parameters in conjunction with energy per cache access from Mc-
PAT to determine the energy of CC operations (Table 3.5). CC operations cost higher in
lower-level caches as they employ larger sub-arrays. However, they do deliver higher sav-
ings (compared to baseline read/write(s) needed) as they have larger in-cache interconnect
components. For search, we assume a write operation for key; this cost will get amortized
over large searches.
1SRAM arrays we model are 6T cell based. Lower-level caches (L2/L3) are optimized for density and
employ 6T-based arrays. However, L1-cache can employ 8T cell based designs. To support in-place opera-
tions in such a design, a differential read-disturb resilient 8T design [149] can be used.
2The optimal sub-array dimension for L3 and L2 caches we model are 512 × 512 and 128 × 512 bits
respectively.
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cache write read cmp copy search not logic
L3 2852 2452 840 1340 3692 1340 1672
L2 1154 802 242 608 1396 608 704
L1 375 295 186 324 561 324 387
Table 3.5: Cache energy (pJ) per cache-block (64-byte)
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Figure 3.7: Benefit of CC for 4KB operand. a) Throughput b) Dynamic energy
3.6.4 Microbenchmark Study
To demonstrate the efficacy of Compute Caches we model four microbenchmarks:
copy, compare, search and logical-or. We compare Compute Caches to a baseline(Base -
32) which supports 32-byte SIMD loads and stores.
Figure 3.7 (a) depicts the throughput attained for different operations for operand size of
4KB. For this experiment, all operands are in L3 cache and the Compute Cache operation is
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Figure 3.8: Total energy benefit of CC for 4KB operand.
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performed therein. Among the operations, for baseline, search achieves highest throughput
as it incurs single cache miss for the key and subsequent cache misses are only for data.
Compute Cache accelerates throughput for all operations: 54× over Base 32 averaged
across the four kernels. Our throughput improvement has two primary sources: massive
data parallelism exposed in presence of independent sub-arrays to compute in, and latency
reduction due to avoiding data movement to the core. For instance, for copy operation, data
parallelism exposes 32× and latency reduction exposes 1.55× throughput improvement.
Figure 3.7 (b) depicts the dynamic energy consumed for operand size of 4KB. Dy-
namic energy depicted is broken down into core, cache data access (cache-access), cache
interconnect (cache-ic) and network-on-chip (noc) components. We term data movement
energy to be everything except the core component. Overall, CC provides dynamic energy
savings of 90%, 89%, 71% and 92% for copy, compare, search and logical (OR) kernels
relative to Base 32. Large vector CC instructions help bring down core component of en-
ergy. Further, CC successfully eliminates all the components of data movement. Writes
incurred due to key replication limit efficacy of search CC operation in bringing down L3
cache energy components. As data size to be searched increases, key replication overheads
will get amortized increasing effectiveness of CC.
Figure 3.8 depicts total energy consumed broken down into static and dynamic com-
ponents. Due to reduction in execution time, CC can significantly reduce static energy.
Overall, averaged across the four kernels studied, CC provides 91% in total energy savings
relative to Base 32.
Near-place design:
In our analysis so far, we have assumed perfect operand locality i.e. all Compute Cache
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Figure 3.9: a) Total energy of in-place vs near place for 4KB operand b) Savings in dynamic
energy for 4KB operand for different cache levels
operations are performed in-place. Figure 3.9 (a) depicts the total energy for near-place and
in-place CC configurations. Recall that in-place computation enables far more parallelism
than near-place and offers larger savings in terms of performance and hence total energy.
For example, our L3-cache allows 8KB data to be operated in parallel. Near-place design
would need 128 64-byte wide logical units to provide equivalent data parallelism. This is
not a trivial overhead. As such, for 4KB operands, in-cache provides 3.6× total energy
savings and 16× throughput improvement on average over near-place. Note however that,
near-place can still offer considerable benefits over the baseline architecture.
Computing at different cache levels: We next evaluate the efficacy of Compute Caches
when operands are present in different cache levels. Figure 3.9 (b) depicts the difference
in dynamic energy between CC configurations and their corresponding Base 32 config-
urations. As expected, the absolute savings are higher, when operands are in lower-level
caches. However, we find that doing Compute Cache operations in L1 or L2 cache can
also provide significant savings. As the number of CC instructions stays same regardless of
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Figure 3.10: a) Total energy benefit b) Performance improvement of CC for applications
cache level, core energy savings is equal for all cache levels. Overall, CC provides savings
of 95% and 93% for L1 and L2 caches respectively relative to Base 32.
3.6.5 Application Benchmarks
In this section we study the benefits of Compute Caches for five applications. Fig-
ure 3.10 (b) shows the overall speedup of Compute Caches for four of these applications.
We see a performance improvement of 2× for WordCount, 1.5× for StringMatch, 3.2× for
BMM, and 1.6× for DB-BitMap. Figure 3.10 (a) shows ratio of total energy of CC to base-
line processor with 32-byte SIMD units. We observe average energy savings of 2.7× across
these applications. Majority of benefits come from three sources: data parallelism exposed
by large vector operations, reduction in number of instructions and data movement.
For instance, recall that while baseline WordCount does a binary search over dictio-
nary of unique words, Compute Cache does a CAM search using cc search instructions.
Superficially it may seem that binary search will outperform CAM search. However, we
find that CC version has 87% fewer instructions by doing away with book keeping in-
structions of binary search. Further, our vector cc search enables energy efficient CAM
searches. These benefits are also evident in StringMatch, BMM and DB-BitMap (32%,
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Figure 3.11: Performance overhead of CC for checkpointing
98% and 43% instruction reduction respectively). The massive data level parallelism we
enable benefits data intensive range and join queries in DB-BitMap application. Recall that
this benchmark performs many independent logical OR operations over large bitmap bins.
Since these operations are independent, many of them can be issued in parallel.
Significant cache locality exhibited by these applications makes them highly suitable
for Compute Caches. As cache accesses are cheaper than memory accesses, computation in
cache is more profitable for data with high locality or reuse. The dictionary in WordCount
has high locality. BMM has inherent locality due to the nature of matrix multiplication. In
DB-BitMap, there is significant reuse within a query due to aggregation of results into a
single bitmap bin, and there is potential reuse of bitmaps across queries. In StringMatch,
locality comes due to repeated use of encrypted keys.
Figure 3.11 depicts the overall checkpointing overhead for SPLASH-2 applications as
compared to baseline with no checkpointing. In absence of SIMD support, this overhead
can be as high as 68% while in presence of it the average overhead is 30%. By further
reducing instruction count and avoiding data movement, CC brings down this overhead
to a mere 6%. CC successfully relegates checkpointing to cache, avoids data pollution of
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Figure 3.12: Total energy with and without checkpointing
higher level caches and relieves the processor of any checkpointing overhead. Figure 3.12
shows significant energy savings due to Compute Caches. Note that, for checkpointing, all
operations are page-aligned and hence we achieve perfect operand locality.
3.7 Related Work
To our knowledge, Compute Caches is the first to make a case for off-loading computa-
tion to caches. Our SRAM design enables in-place computation. As this proposal focuses
on reducing data movement and making it efficient, we compare and contrast prior work
which addresses both of these aspects of data movement.
Near Memory Computing:
Concept of near memory computing or processing in memory (PIM) has been around
for some time [58, 77, 86, 102, 106]. Recent advances with die-stacking which make inte-
grating high-speed logic process technology with memory possible have renewed interest
in near memory computing [12, 159, 53, 162, 109]. The key idea in these works is to
place computation near main memory. Ahn et al. [22] proposed a locality aware PIM de-
sign, which opportunistically decides when computation should be offloaded to memory
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and when it should be performed using host processor instructions. TCAM [64] enables
in-memory associative computing using STT-MRAM technologies.
PIM is an effective approach for reducing data movement costs for applications that
have no cache locality. However, for cache friendly applications, compute caches are a
better choice. Ultimately, the locality characteristics of an application should guide in
which level of memory hierarchy (registers, higher-level caches, lower-level caches, or
memory) the computation must be performed.
Seshadri et al. [125] exploit existing DRAM operation to perform a bitwise AND/OR
of two DRAM rows completely within DRAM. Our proposal complements [125] when
applications have cache locality. For applications with cache locality, in-DRAM compu-
tation is energy inefficient compared to compute caches. Also, unlike our proposal, every
logical operation in [125] first requires all operands in the logical operation to be copied
to new DRAM rows because DRAM read is destructive. This incurs additional overheads.
Overhead of such copies is justified only at large granularities. In-cache computation, how-
ever, can support much smaller granularities. Finally, while this work is similarly limited
by operand locality, it does not discuss ways to address it but proposes copying of operands
from one DRAM sub-array to another to perform in-place computation.
Processing in memory solutions like RowClone [126] exploit internal DRAM organi-
zation to perform fast copy operations and can be employed for in-memory checkpoint-
ing. However, offloading copying to memory requires flushing dirty data from higher level
caches and will cause high latency cache misses for application data. In our proposal, by
performing copy at various cache levels can avoid this cost.
Duarte et al [50] propose adding an indexing table near cache to accelerate cache line
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copying. They neither provide in-place copy nor provide any other operation but copy.
Reducing data movement Several proposals from both hardware and software domain
can reduce on-chip data movement. Non-uniform cache access(NUCA) organizations, in
which large last level caches are decomposed into smaller slices have been widely stud-
ied [80, 66, 37, 45] to exploit variable wire lengths between cache slices and cores. Locality
aware task mapping [54, 19, 156, 42] can also reduce data movement by placing frequently
communicating tasks close to each other. Such techniques reduce data movement costs by
moving data closer to computation cores that need them. Compute caches do the opposite
– it moves compute near the data.
Optimizations to reduce cache misses [78, 148, 69, 128], conflicts [27, 79, 114], or
placing data in locality tailored fashion [104, 45], energy efficient communication fab-
rics [99, 142, 44, 82, 139, 43, 18] can all in general reduce data movement over cache
hierarchy. In addition to this, there is a rich literature which employs cache bypass-
ing [70, 115, 74] by predicting reuse distances of data. Such techniques can complement
our design by helping to effectively select the cache level to perform a CC operation.
Logic in memory arrays: Associative memories [103] perform XOR operations within
the array, but have either much larger bit-cells or more complicated bit-cells [108] or non-
CMOS bit-cells [64]. Also they have different peripheral circuit organization around the
array. Our proposed solution does not modify the foundry provided, highly optimized,
six transistor CMOS bit-cell and uses an organization compatible with conventional cache
sub-arrays.
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3.8 Discussion
While Section 3.7 compares Compute Caches to other contemporary works which fo-
cus on optimizing data movement, this section places Compute Caches in the larger context
of available computation nodes. Programmers today have several architectures at their dis-
posal (multi-cores, GPUs) to realize performance. Further, as discussed in Section 3.7,
research proposals are also looking at using DRAM and emerging memories to perform
computations. This raises an interesting question as to which computation node is best
suitable for a given computation or in other words, how do these computation nodes com-
pare against each other. We compare available and proposed computation nodes against
Compute Caches along three dimensions: potential to reduce data movement costs, data-
parallelism available and computation capability.
First, as this work demonstrates (Figure 3.3), general purpose cores expend a great deal
of time and energy in data movement over cache hierarchies. As GPUs employ caches too,
they also expend energy in data movement over them. In contrast, by enabling computation
inside caches we can save this component of energy. Computation inside/near memory
(DRAM and emerging memories like memristors) can avoid expending data movement
energy over caches. However, in presence of cache locality for operands, computation
in caches is far more profitable as each cache access is cheaper (delay and energy) as
compared to a memory access.
Second, data parallelism in compute caches is orders of magnitude higher than SIMD
units in CPUs, and even GPUs. For example, we can re-purpose 30 MB LLC in the server
class Intel Xeon E5-2597 to support 983,040 bit-serial ALU slots. This compute capabil-
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ity is significantly higher than aggregate SIMD width in Xeon (448 32-bit slots), or even
Nvidia Titan Xp (3840 32-bit slots). While data parallelism in DRAM and emerging mem-
ories like memristors can be higher than present in caches (owing to their larger sizes),
former does not support in-place operations due to destructive nature of DRAM reads ne-
cessitating copies and latter is a speculative technology, and is also significantly slower
than SRAM.
Finally, the set of operations currently supported inside caches is limited as compared to
that supported by a general purpose core or GPU or even memristors. However, as demon-
strated in this work, Compute Cache enabled logical and copy operations can accelerate a
wide variety of applications such as search engines, cryptography, bitmap based databases,
bioinformatics and operating system primitives.
To conclude, nearly three-fourth of a server class processor die area today is devoted for
caches. Even accelerators use large caches. Our work provides evidence that turning them
into compute units can deliver significant performance and energy savings. As caches can
be found in almost all modern processors, we envision compute caches to be a disruptive
technology that can enhance commodity processors with large data-parallel accelerators
for almost free of cost. CPU vendors (Intel, IBM, etc.) can thus continue to provide
high-performance general-purpose processing, while enhancing them with a co-processor
like capability to exploit massive data-parallelism. Such a processor design is particularly
attractive for difficult-to-accelerate applications that frequently switch between sequential
and data-parallel computation. As such, Compute Caches is a worthy addition to available
computation nodes.
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3.9 Conclusion
In this chapter we proposed the Compute Cache architecture which unlocks hitherto un-
tapped computational capability present in on-chip caches by exploiting emerging SRAM
circuit technology of bit-line computing. Using compute enabled caches, we can perform
several simple operations in-place in cache over very-wide operands. This exposes massive
data parallelism saving instruction processing, cache interconnect and intra-cache energy
expenditure. We present solutions to several challenges exposed by such an architecture.
We demonstrate the efficacy of our architecture using a suite of data intensive benchmarks
and micro-benchmarks.
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CHAPTER IV
InvisiMem: A Low-overhead Secure Processor
This chapter presents InvisiMem, a low-overhead secure processor design with strong
defenses against memory side channels and efficient data freshness guarantees. Both mem-
ory side channel and data freshness are well studied problems and prior work has proposed
solutions with various optimizations. However, in our work we look at these security vul-
nerabilities in new light of 3D stacked memory with integrated logic layer. Our proposal
shows how in presence of such “smart” memories simpler and efficient solutions to these
security vulnerabilities are possible.
4.1 Introduction
Cloud computing allows clients to outsource their computations to untrusted cloud ser-
vice providers. Ensuring privacy of code and data on a computer physically owned and
maintained by an untrusted party is challenging, as we must assume a powerful adversary.
A malicious insider may even have physical access to the data-centers, making them vul-
nerable to physical attacks, such as probing the memory bus [10, 145].
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A common solution is to reduce the attack surface by minimizing the trusted comput-
ing base (TCB) to a secure processor [9, 138] and a small portion of the client’s applica-
tion. Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [97, 23] provides hardware primitives for
this purpose. An SGX-enabled processor seeks to isolate code and data of private enclave
functions in an application from the rest of the system, including its own public functions,
system software, and hardware peripherals.
While the secure processor is trusted, the memory bus and the memory are not. De-
fending against memory bus side channel requires solutions to at least three problems: data
and address confidentiality, data integrity and freshness, and timing channel. Solutions to
these problems are expensive. For example, best known solution for address confidential-
ity is Oblivious RAM (ORAM) [60], which increases memory bandwidth consumption by
˜100X.
In this chapter, we present InvisiMem, a low-overhead secure processor that provides
ORAM equivalent guarantees for the address side channel, ensures data integrity, freshness,
and mitigates memory timing channel. InvisiMem is based on our observation that smart
memories (memories with compute capability) with packetized interface (as opposed to
the DDR interface) can be taken advantage of to design an ultra-low overhead secure pro-
cessor. Recent advancements in 3D integration technology such as the Hybrid Memory
Cube (HMC) [16] make it possible to stack DRAM layers on top of logic layers, and con-
nect them using Through Silicon Vias (TSV). Unlike a memory bus that is exposed to an
adversary, the TSVs pass completely through a silicon wafer, and therefore it is almost
impossible to probe them without destroying the 3D package. Thus, there is no need for
expensive mitigation solutions to protect the communication over the TSVs.
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InvisiMem executes the private enclave functions in a SGX-like secure high-performance
host processor connected to the smart memory via a memory bus using a packetized in-
terface (Figure 4.1 (a)). The logic in smart memory is included in TCB and is used to
implement cryptographic functions, while memory layers remain outside TCB.
Data and Address Confidentiality: A secure processor guarantees data confidential-
ity by encrypting data before sending it to memory. Memory address, however, is sent in
plain-text on the bus, as required by the DRAM’s DDR interface. By observing the mem-
ory addresses, an adversary can infer sensitive program inputs [151] and cryptographic
keys [163]. Prior solutions tackle this leak using Oblivious RAM (ORAM) [60]; a cryp-
tographic construction that obfuscates memory accesses to make them indistinguishable
from a random access pattern. To do so, it issues several memory accesses for every nor-
mal access. In spite of significant recent advancements [56, 160] such ORAM-based so-
lutions increase memory access latency considerably (˜20X) and incur huge performance
overheads(˜4X). ORAM also has security limitations in that it does not help guard against
memory timing channel [91].
InvisiMem’s trusted compute capability in memory allows the processor to send the
whole request packet, including the address, in an encrypted form. We observe, however,
that address encryption alone is insufficient to provide ORAM guarantees. First, read re-
quests or responses should appear indistinguishable from their write counterparts to an
adversary snooping the memory bus to avoid leaking the memory access type. Second, on
a read to a location, if the memory simply returns stored encrypted data at that location, an
adversary can correlate it to the last write or previous reads to the same location. Solutions
to address these problems are discussed.
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Figure 4.1: Smart memory based secure designs. a) InvisiMem far b) InvisiMem near
Freshness without Merkle trees: Guaranteeing data freshness requires that an adver-
sary should not be able to rollback the state of a memory block by recording and replaying
older packets (either by manipulating values in memory or while being transmitted over
the bus). To defeat such replay attacks, a conventional secure processor maintains cur-
rent versions of memory blocks using Merkle trees [117] and verifies that a read response
returns the latest version. Merkle trees impose severe memory space and bandwidth re-
quirements [63].
We observe that smart memory can provide freshness without requiring the Merkle tree
construct. To do that we set up a secure communication channel between processor and
memory using authenticated encryption. This is possible thanks to the compute capability
of memory. Using authenticated encryption, we can prevent data manipulation in memory
or over the memory bus as both parties can ensure that requests/responses are originating
from the authenticated counterpart and that they are fresh.
Timing Channel: Smart memory also enables an efficient solution for solving one type
of memory timing channel: memory access and response times seen on the memory bus.
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InvisiMem sends constant rate heart-beat packets between the processor and smart mem-
ory in both directions. When an actual request or response is available, the next heart-beat
packet’s slot is used or else a dummy packet is transmitted. This is viable for systems
with smart memory (HMC-like) for several reasons. First, the interface employed in such
systems sends synchronization packets periodically even when there is no communica-
tion [12]. Hence, the energy overhead of turning them into heart-beat packets is relatively
low. Second, unlike traditional memory systems, smart memory allows dummy requests
to be ignored, lowering their energy overhead. Third, compute capability in smart mem-
ory allows responses from memory to be sent at a constant rate (unlike traditional memory
systems). This helps hide variations in access times to different locations.
The above solution naturally supports a system with multiple memory modules con-
nected to a processor. Sending constant rate heart-beat packets between every pair of com-
municating nodes hides all access patterns, and thereby also hides addresses accessed. We
also discuss some precautions needed to support such systems.
Optimizations: Encrypting and decrypting packets constitute the majority of the per-
formance overhead in InvisiMem. Specifically, computing OTPs (one-time pads) using
AES incur the highest latency. We take these operations out of the critical path of a mem-
ory access by precomputing OTPs before a request/response is sent or received. We also
investigate various designs for efficiently storing and retrieving meta-data (for encryption
and integrity checks) which exploit smart memory characteristics like vault-level paral-
lelism.
With these optimizations, InvisiMem incurs 14.21% performance overhead, 53.03%
energy overhead and 37.5% memory space overhead compared to an Intel Xeon-like pro-
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cessor.
The logic layer in smart memory has sufficient area and power budget (nearly 55W [51])
for a low-power processor. Executing enclaves in this core can hide all the communication
between the core and memory, and thereby eliminate memory bus side channel. The trade-
off, however, is that its compute capability may not match that of a high-performance core.
We study this using a variant of our design, named InvisiMem near (Figure 4.1 (b)).
Remote attestation and Key Management: InvisiMem expands TCB to include logic
layer stacked with memory. Note that DRAM layers in memory are still outside TCB.
Almost all secure processors such as Intel SGX, including all ORAM based designs, rely
on public key infrastructure (PKI). Similarly, we propose that smart memory vendors also
support PKI for trusted logic in memory. Using the public key of the smart memory, we
show that a secure host processor can easily establish a secure communication channel with
the smart memory’s logic.
4.2 Motivation and Background
In this section we briefly describe hardware support for secure containers (enclaves),
which we assume in our work. We also present a threat model and discuss prior defenses for
memory bus side channel. Finally, we provide a brief background on 3D stacked memory,
which we use in our system.
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Channel Leak/Vulnerability Freecursive
ORAM [56]
Ghostrider [91] InvisiMem far InvisiMem -
near
Passive
Memory
Bus
Probe
Data Data encryption Data encryption Data encryption
Eliminate
memory bus
channel
Address ORAM ORAM Whole packet encryp-
tion + Double data and
timestamp encryption
Access type (R/W) ORAM ORAM Same packet size for
read/write
Trace length with [57], yes Deterministic execu-
tion
constant rate request-
s/responses
Access time with [57], yes Deterministic execu-
tion
constant rate request-
s/responses
Active
Memory
Bus
Probe
Data Data encryption Data encryption Enclave checks +
Authenticated
Encryption (HMAC)
Enclave checks
+
Authenticated
Encryption
(HMAC)
Data corruption HMAC no
Replay attack HMAC + access count no
+ position data checks
Write set ORAM ORAM
Cold
Boot
Data Data encryption Data encryption Data encryption Data encryp-
tion
System
software
Execution time no Deterministic execu-
tion
no no
Table 4.1: Comparison of InvisiMem to ORAM-based defenses. Smart memory enables
more efficient and simpler solutions.
4.2.1 Enclaves for Isolation
Intel SGX [23, 97] is the latest hardware support for building trusted computing sys-
tems. It provides capability for isolating the execution of an enclave from the rest of the
system, including the public functions of the application, system software, and other hard-
ware peripherals.
An enclave is a secure container that contains private data and the code that operates
on it. An application is responsible for specifying enclaves and invoking them. When an
enclave is invoked through special CPU instructions, the untrusted system software loads
the enclave contents to the portion of the protected memory allocated for the enclave’s
execution. The secure processor computes the enclave’s measurement hash over initial data
and code, which the remote client uses for software attestation. Thereafter, the enclave is
executed in a protected mode, where the hardware checks ensure that every memory access
to protected memory is from its enclave.
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4.2.2 Threat Model
We assume a secure processor that supports isolated execution of enclaves (e.g. Intel
SGX [23, 97]). We assume that an adversary cannot observe the communication between
the layers in smart memory and that its logic layer is secure.
We assume a powerful adversary that can compromise the operating system and use
OS privileges to compromise the confidentiality and integrity of applications. This adver-
sary also has physical access to the computers running client computations. Thus, he can
probe the off-chip memory bus to observe (and modify) the communication between the
secure processor and the memory, including the event times. We assume that DRAM die is
untrusted, as the adversary may have the capability to scan DRAM contents through cold
(re)boot attacks [65] or corrupt state using Row-Hammer attacks [84].
We assume that the execution of a private enclave function and its data in the processor
(registers, caches, on-chip interconnect, performance counters) is secure and isolated from
other computation. Several prior studies have discussed solutions for ensuring this property
in a multi-core processor with shared hardware structures [40, 127, 143, 33]. We also as-
sume prior solutions for mitigating page-fault side-channel [40, 132] in enclaved systems.
Power [85], thermal [110], program execution time [158] side-channels, and leaks via com-
munication patterns over the network [100, 124], have been addressed in prior work and
are outside the scope of this work.
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4.2.3 Memory Bus Side Channel and Cold Boot Defenses
Table 4.1 compares various leaks through memory bus side channel and cold boot attack
that secure processors must protect. It describes the solutions used in two of the recent
ORAM-based work, Freecursive ORAM [56] and Ghostrider [91]. While more recent
ORAM-based work exists [160], we consider Freecursive ORAM [56] as it proposes a
ORAM-based defense optimized for providing data integrity and freshness guarantees as
well.
In most trusted computing systems such as SGX, all the hardware components outside
the secure processor are untrusted, including the memory and the memory bus. To ensure
confidentiality, they use randomized encryption to encrypt the data before writing to mem-
ory, and decrypt it when it is read back. This protects sensitive data from leaking directly
through memory bus probes and cold boot attacks. However, an adversary can still observe
addresses and access types (read or write) by passively probing the bus.
To protect confidentiality of addresses (also, access types and write sets), prior solutions
employ expensive ORAM [60] construct. To obfuscate the address pattern, depending on
the memory size, an ORAM access may require one to two orders of more memory accesses
compared to a normal DRAM access. Recent hardware innovations such as Freecursive
ORAM have made significant improvements to bring down the performance cost to about
4X [56], though at a significant increase in hardware complexity, on-chip (80KB) and off-
chip (more than 2X) space overhead.
ORAM does not prevent memory access time and total number of memory accesses
from leaking. This is provided by the memory-trace obliviousness (MTO) guarantee pro-
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vided by Ghostrider [91] which ensures that the program execution (instruction trace, time)
is independent of program sensitive inputs. This requires a deterministic compiler, hard-
ware which prohibits most commonly used optimizations (caches, instruction re-ordering
etc) and also imposes non-trivial constraints on the program (e.g. sensitive input-independent
loop guards). As a result, it incurs nearly 6X performance overhead. compared to a baseline
with a single-issue, in-order processor.
An adversary can corrupt data in memory and violate data integrity. A replay attack
is also possible, where an adversary manages to rollback the state of a memory block by
replaying an older write message. To provide data integrity, secure processors typically
create and store hash message authentication code (HMAC) along with data in memory. On
a read, HMAC can be used to detect data integrity violation. Replay attacks are thwarted
by including a version number during the HMAC creation. The processor tracks the current
version of the memory state using on-chip storage [152, 56], and uses it to ensure that a
read returns the latest version. Both these guarantees incur additional performance and
space overhead, and complexity.
With 3D smart memory, and by increasing the trusted computing base to include its
logic layer, we can reduce the complexity of these problems, and realize low-overhead se-
curity solutions. We seek to guarantee memory-trace obliviousness (MTO) property (except
not protecting program execution time from leaking) along with data integrity and freshness
guarantees.
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4.2.4 Smart Memory
3D integration has led to the rise of 3D-DRAM devices such as the Hybrid Memory
Cube (HMC) [16]. A typical 3D-DRAM consists of several layers of DRAM dies stacked
on top of each other, with a logic layer at the bottom, all internally connected using Through
Silicon Vias (TSVs) [12]. The layers are partitioned vertically into vaults (each with sev-
eral DRAM banks) which can be accessed in parallel. HMC device is connected to the
processor via SERDES links. Unlike traditional DRAM’s DDR interface with low-level
commands, HMC device is exposed via a more flexible packet interface.
Recent HMC device has a capacity of 2GB and can provide maximum memory band-
width of 160GB/s [16]. While the logic layer in current devices contains circuits for in-
terfacing with the vaults (memory controllers), it has sufficient area and thermal power
budget (55W [51]) to include fairly sophisticated computational units, such as a low-power
processor and/or cryptographic units.
In 2.5D stacking, the memory and the processor can be interconnected through metal
layers within a silicon interposer [47]. These metal tracks are etched using the same pro-
cesses as the tracks on the silicon chips, and hence they are orders of magnitude smaller
than the tracks on a conventional memory bus. It is therefore reasonable to assume that an
adversary will be unable to tap the communication between the processor and memory in
2.5D system, providing similar security properties as 3D. Also, since logic is not stacked
at the bottom of the memory layers, the thermal power budget would allow it to support a
high-performance core.
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4.3 InvisiMem Design
InvisiMem builds upon enclave support similar to Intel SGX or Sanctum [40] for isola-
tion. As memory layers in smart memory are untrusted (cold-boot attacks, Section 4.2.2),
we store encrypted data in memory using randomized encryption, similar to SGX.
We first discuss InvisiMem far, which executes the enclave in a secure high perfor-
mance processor (Figure 4.1 a)). Later, we discuss a more optimized design, InvisiMem -
near, which executes the enclave within smart memory’s logic.
We start by discussing smart memory advantages which help design low-overhead de-
fenses for memory bus side channel and also lead to an efficient solution to guarantee
freshness. We also discuss performance optimizations that we employ and efficient storage
of meta-data in smart memory.
4.3.1 Advantages of Smart Memory
Compute capability in memory allows whole memory packets to be encrypted and de-
crypted. Also, it makes it possible to generate dummy responses, and discard dummy
requests.
In traditional DRAM systems, on-chip memory controller issues low-level DDR stan-
dard compliant commands to interact with the off-chip DRAM modules. In contrast, a
smart memory has a packetized interface. The logic layer in smart memory decodes com-
mand packets from processor and internally routes them to the memory controller associ-
ated with every vault. The memory controller then communicates with the DRAM memory
in its vault through DDR commands. Smart memory’s packetized design allows us to seam-
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from writes (b) Correlation attack
lessly extend its packet processing logic with security functionality, without modifying the
DDR standard, which is harder.
Unlike a memory bus, the TSVs that connect the logic layer and the DRAM memory
pass entirely through silicon. It is almost impossible for an adversary to launch a physical
attack by probing the TSVs without destroying the 3D package.
4.3.2 Protecting Memory Address and Type
In InvisiMem, secure processor encrypts and sends the whole packet, including data,
address, access type (read or write) using randomized encryption. This is possible only
because smart memory is capable of decrypting addresses. Randomized encryption makes
it hard for an adversary to correlate messages that carry the same address. However, en-
crypting address alone is not enough to ensure ORAM properties.
First, an adversary can correlate a read to a location with an earlier write to the same
location by simply comparing the encrypted data (or timestamp used to encrypt it) as de-
picted in Figure 4.2 (b). To solve this problem, while responding to a read request, the
smart memory double encrypts an already encrypted data and its timestamp, before send-
ing a response.
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Second, the communication between the processor and the memory in an insecure de-
sign is noticeably different for reads and writes (Figure 4.2 (a)). A read request and a write
response do not carry data, while a write request and a read response do. Thus, an attacker
could infer whether an access is a read or a write. We eliminate this leak by ensuring equal
packet sizes for both read and write request/responses by adding a dummy block to read
request and write response.
These solutions are sufficient to provide guarantees equivalent to ORAM. However,
they are not sufficient to prevent the number of memory accesses and their access times
from leaking (ORAM leaks these too). Furthermore, response times may vary depend-
ing on the memory location accessed. We address these timing channel problems in Sec-
tion 4.3.4.
4.3.3 Guaranteeing Data Integrity and Freshness
Our threat model assumes that DRAM layers are untrusted and therefore stored data
can be corrupted (e.g. Row-hammer attacks [84]). An adversary may also corrupt data
communication on the bus through active probing. Creating and storing a hash message
authentication code (HMAC) with data on a write, and checking the code on a read can
solve these issues.
Guaranteeing freshness, however, requires more extensive support in conventional hard-
ware. In a replay attack, an adversary manages to rollback the state of a memory block by
replaying an older data. Replay attacks can be prevented by including a version number
during the HMAC creation. The processor must securely track the current version of the
memory state [152, 56], and use it to check if a read is returning the latest version. But these
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data integrity checks incur additional performance and space overhead, and complexity.
InvisiMem far uses authenticated encryption [96] to guarantee freshness. Authenti-
cated encryption ensures integrity and freshness of data sent over the untrusted memory
bus. Using authenticated encryption, the sender (processor or memory) generates and sends
an authentication tag over the encrypted packet sent to the receiver. The receiver uses this
tag to check if the packet is the latest message from the trusted sender.
Authenticated encryption [96] uses an one-time pad (encryption of monotonically in-
creasing counter) to generate encrypted data over which the authentication tag is then gen-
erated. As such, on a message replay, receiver’s regenerated tag (using latest one-time pad)
will not match the received tag (replayed) causing authentication failure. Note that when
memory responds, it generates this tag over double encrypted data and timestamp (en-
crypted) (Section 4.3.2). Unlike prior designs [152], we avoid significant hardware state
and memory space needed to track and check the versions of memory blocks.
The secure logic in memory performs the integrity checks only for accesses to protected
memory range reserved for enclaves. It relies on the secure host processor to perform
the necessary enclave checks to ensure that the accesses to enclave locations are from the
enclave that owns them.
4.3.4 Mitigating Memory Bus Timing Channel
Memory access times observed on the memory bus can leak the program paths taken in
an execution [57]. Memory response times to requests can also leak sensitive information.
For example, reads with row-buffer locality will have significantly lower response latency
than reads to different rows (Figure 4.3).
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Figure 4.3: Time taken to respond by memory can leak sensitive inputs.
To solve both these leaks, the processor and the memory send heart-beat packets at a
constant rate to each other. When there is a real packet to send, the sender transmits it at
the next available slot. In the absence of a real packet, a dummy packet is sent, which is
ignored by the receiver. This design trivially eliminates the two leaks noted above. Smart
memory’s capability to generate packets at a constant rate makes this design feasible. In
a conventional memory system, as only the processor can send requests at a chosen rate,
variations in response times noted above (Figure 4.3) are hard to mask.
We also experimented with a dynamic scheme that adjusted the packet rate according
to application’s memory access characteristics [57], but we did not find any significant per-
formance or energy benefit in the context of a smart memory based design (Section 4.5.4).
We believe this is partly due to unique characteristics of smart memories. Smart mem-
ory is different from traditional memory systems modeled in prior work [57] in two aspects.
First, smart memory can ignore dummy requests. Second, idle energy expended in smart
memory is very high compared to a traditional DDR interface, as SerDes links in packe-
tized interface require null packets to be sent at a constant rate for synchronization [12].
Link energy to transmit a null packet is about 75% of energy to send an actual packet [81].
Further, the energy expended in encrypting/decrypting packets does not constitute a
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significant fraction of the total system energy, even while operating at a packet rate that is
high enough for the most memory intensive programs we studied.
As a dynamic scheme’s security guarantee is also weaker than a static rate, we chose the
latter. Instead of choosing a constant packet rate for all applications, we could select a rate
for each application using profiling or user input, without sacrificing security properties.
Though we did not find a significant benefit for this approach, it may be useful for very
memory intensive applications needing a higher packet rate than what we chose.
While outside the scope of this work, an attacker capable of measuring power side chan-
nel can distinguish real and dummy requests in InvisiMem, as the smart memory ignores
dummy requests. If this is a concern, instead of ignoring a dummy request, we can issue
an access to a random location.
4.3.5 Performance: OTP Pre-computation
One-time pad (OTP) generation, which uses an AES encryption, is the most time con-
suming portion of GCM [96] which we use for authenticated encryption. We take it off the
critical path of a request or a response by pre-computing it.
An OTP is generated from a timestamp counter and a private key. A timestamp counter’s
state is shared between the processor and the smart memory. We enable sharing by initial-
izing the respective timestamp counters in both processor and memory at the start of a pro-
gram’s execution to the same value. Thereafter, the sender and the receiver synchronously
increment the counter on sending or receiving a packet.
Synchronous timestamp counters avoid sending the timestamps along with each packet.
More importantly, the sender or the receiver can pre-compute an OTP even before a packet
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is ready to be encrypted or decrypted. The only case where this is not possible is when
decrypting a read response as the timestamp stored with the data must be first recovered to
compute the OTP and then decrypt the data using it. See Section 4.4.2 and Figure 4.5 for
more details.
Synchronous timestamp counters are feasible as the communication network is point-
to-point between the processor and memory, and is generally lossless. If a communication
link is unreliable, then timestamp counters can lose synchronization when a packet is lost.
Unreliable networks typically deal with lost messages by tagging packets with sequence
numbers, and re-synchronize when a packet loss is detected. Similar techniques can be
used to track lost packets in our system.
4.3.6 Space: Meta-Data in Smart Memory
We consider two design alternatives for storing meta-data (timestamp and tag) with
their data. In the fragmented design, data of a cache block is stored along with its meta-
data in memory. This design has relatively lower complexity as the memory controller can
fetch both data and its meta-data using a single request. However, storing meta-data with
data consumes two cache blocks worth of space, even though meta-data is smaller than a
cache data block.
In the non-fragmented design, we store data and meta-data at non-contiguous loca-
tions. This allows meta-data of multiple data blocks to be compactly packed together with
less wastage of memory. However, this requires two requests per data access. We reduce
any potential performance overhead due to the serialization of these requests by exploit-
ing vault-level parallelism (Section 4.2.4). To achieve this, we map addresses to physical
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Figure 4.4: Existing client-host remote attestation and key exchange (left). Smart memory
authentication and key exchange under InvisiMem (right).
locations such that data and its meta-data are always stored in different vaults (note how-
ever that in a multiple module system, data and it’s associated metadata are present in a
single module). Furthermore, as adjacent data blocks may be accessed in close succes-
sion, our mapping ensures that data and meta-data of spatially adjacent data blocks in the
address space are stored in different vaults. See Section 4.4.4 for details. With these per-
formance optimizations, non-fragmented design incurs only a negligible performance over-
head compared to the fragmented design, but has better space utilization (91.66% compared
to 68.75%).
4.3.7 Remote Attestation and Key Exchange
We now discuss a simplified client-processor remote attestation protocol [9, 23, 39], and
how we could adapt it to set up a secure communication channel between the processor and
memory in InvisiMem.
Remote attestation is a process by which a remote host proves to a client that it is run-
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ning trusted software on trusted hardware. On successful conclusion of remote attestation,
the client shares its sensitive data (e.g., private keys) with the host before commencing
computation.
A secure processor manufacturer endows each secure processor with a unique public-
private key pair. It also serves as a certificate authority that provides a certificate that binds
the processor’s identity to its public key. In addition, a secure processor has support for
integrity measurement (a hash of code, data, and system state).
The client aims to attest a remote processor and setup a shared session key to communi-
cate sensitive data with it. To do that, it sends a key agreement message ( 1 ) to the remote
host [48]. The processor uses this to generate a response key agreement message. This
along with its integrity measurement is signed with the processor’s private key. The signed
message is sent along with the processor’s certificate issued by its manufacturer ( 2 ) to the
client. The client ( 3 ), first verifies that the certificate is valid using manufacturer’s public
key. Then, using the processor’s public key in the certificate, it verifies that the received
message is indeed from the processor. It further checks if the measurement value is as
expected. If it is, then the client uses the key agreement message received to compute the
shared session key for further secure communication.
In InvisiMem, the secure processor and the client use the conventional remote attesta-
tion protocol described above. Secure processor uses a similar protocol to authenticate and
exchange keys with its secure memory. The only difference is that the secure memory does
not need integrity measurement support. To support this, just like processor manufacturers,
we propose that memory manufacturers endow smart memory modules with public-private
key pair, and serve as its certification authorities.
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To support the above protocol, we assume that smart memory’s logic can support asym-
metric encryption. Given its area and thermal budgets (Section 4.2.4), it should be able to
support asymmetric encryption which is implemented even in smart-cards [68] with much
lesser resources.
4.3.7.1 Security Considerations
Remote attestation protocol discussed above is immune to man-in-the middle (MITM)
attacks. The second check in the last step of the protocol described above ( 3 ) ensures that
the response received is indeed from the trusted entity. Private keys stored in secure proces-
sor and secure memory are tamper-proof. But to manage scenarios where vulnerabilities
are discovered after deployment, certificate authorities can maintain certificate revocation
lists. Alternatively, certificates can be associated with expiration dates. None of these
problems and solutions are unique to processor-memory authentication and key exchange
described above, as they exist in client-processor remote attestation as well.
4.3.8 Key and Timestamp Management
Storage: Keys (data and address) and timestamps we employ are stored in special
registers at memory controllers at both side. To ensure process isolation, each process has
a different key. But we need only as many special registers for keys as there are processor
cores, as the number of active processes cannot be more than that. A timestamp can be
shared amongst processes. Security is guaranteed as long as a given timestamp is never
reused for the same key, which is ensured by incrementing it each time it is used. Note that
techniques that tackle timestamp overflow [152] can be adapted in our system.
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Multiple Memory Modules: Systems where a secure processor is connected to multi-
ple memory modules are possible [81]. Therein, the processor can setup a secure channel
with each memory module. This will require a timestamp per memory module. Further-
more, to ensure that the same timestamp-key pair is not reused, we statically partition
timestamp ranges amongst memory modules.
A security vulnerability in such a system is that an adversary can gain some information
about an address accessed simply by observing which module is accessed. Fortunately, our
timing channel solution (Section 4.3.4) addresses this problem.
4.3.9 Near InvisiMem
As noted in Section 4.2.4, the logic layer integrated with memory could support low-
power (3D) or even high-performance cores (2.5D). InvisiMem near exploits this opportu-
nity by assuming that the secure host processor is within smart memory’s logic layer. Since
the TSVs are secure, it obviates the need for protecting communication between the core
and memory. However, we conservatively exclude the DRAM memory layers from TCB
(Section 4.2.2). Therefore, data is still stored in encrypted form in memory, and its integrity
is checked by storing HMAC tags with data and checking them on read.
The memory controller bounces any access from an external device, including the host
processor, by checking if it falls within the range of protected memory region dedicated
for enclaves. Apart from these measures and support for enclave checks, all of which
are already supported in commodity secure processors such as Intel SGX, InvisiMem near
requires little else support to provide the guarantees we seek. Note that this design does
not need additional support to guarantee freshness or prevent memory timing channel leaks
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(Section 4.3.4).
4.4 Implementation
This section describes hardware support for cryptographic primitives, and details how
OTP pre-computation helps reduce the latency of encryption/decryption in a read/write
operation, and how meta-data is stored in 3D memory efficiently.
4.4.1 Hardware Support for Cryptographic Primitives
4.4.1.1 Authenticated Encryption
We use Galois/Counter operation mode (GCM) [96] with AES for authenticated en-
cryption. GCM operates on 128-bit blocks. Therefore, a single cache block (64 bytes) is
broken into 4 blocks of plain-text. One Time Pad (OTP) is generated by using AES en-
cryption on a counter along with a 128-bit encryption key. OTP is then XORed with a
plain-text to generate its cipher-text. The counter used to generated OTP is incremented for
every block that is processed to provide randomized encryption [116]. For authentication,
GCM employs a GHASH function [96], which creates hash of a message ciphertext using a
secret 128-bit hash key (H) derived from the encryption key. The output is an authentication
tag, which is regenerated at the receiver to verify data integrity.
4.4.1.2 Metadata: Timestamps and Keys
InvisiMem far uses three symmetric keys: address (Ka), data (Kd), and data double
encryption (Kd-de). The data double encryption key is used to double encrypt encrypted
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data and timestamp to defend against correlation attack (Section 4.3.2).
We use three timestamps. 128-bit address timestamp (ATS) is used for generating ad-
dress OTP. Address key (Ka) and ATS are used to encrypt packet header and tail, which
includes the address, command, etc. For brevity, we simply refer to these in terms of en-
crypting/decrypting addresses in this section.
Smaller 64-bit data timestamp (DTS1) is used for encrypting 64-byte cache block data
as follows. The cache block is broken into four 128-bit blocks. Timestamp for each block
is produced by concatenating 64-bit timestamp (DTS1) with a 62-bit fixed vector (FV)
and a two bit block-id representing it’s relative position in the cache block. Since the
timestamp for a cache block has to be stored along with data in memory, using a smaller
64-bit timestamp helps save space. For double-encryption of data and its timestamp, we
use a 125-bit timestamp DTS2 concatenated with 3-bit chunk-id while generating the OTP.
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This timestamp is never stored in memory.
4.4.1.3 Augmented Memory Controller
Smart memory has memory controller/s (MMC) in the logic layer which communicate
with the integrated memory controller (PMC) in the processor. We augment both PMC
and MMC to perform authenticated encryption (Figure 4.7 (a)). This requires registers for
timestamps and keys mentioned in Section 4.4.1.2. PMC and MMC have three AES and
four Galois Field multipliers (GF-M) [123] each.
4.4.2 InvisiMem far Security Protocol
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 depict the steps involved in InvisiMem far on a read and write
respectively. We classify all the actions into either ”off-critical path” or ”on-critical path” of
a read or a write access. For simplicity, we only depict the encryption part of GCM and not
authentication tag generation which can be partly overlapped with encryption/decryption.
We also ignore our timing channel solution, which simply requires that once a packet is
ready it is sent at the next available slot.
In Figure 4.5, PMC encrypts an address for read request. Using ATS, we can pre-
compute the OTP required for address encryption, leaving only an XOR operation on the
critical path. Request packet for a read includes the encrypted address and dummy en-
crypted data block. The latter is added to the request packet to make it impossible for
an attacker to differentiate a read request from a write request. On receipt of a request,
MMC decrypts the address; again with a pre-computed OTP and issues a read to DRAM.
On receiving a response from DRAM, MMC encrypts data and its associated timestamp
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using pre-computed OTP generated from DTS2 (double encryption) and sends it to PMC.
Double encryption is done to guard against correlation attack by observing encrypted data
or timestamp. On receipt of response, PMC first decrypts data and timestamp using OTP
pre-computed from DTS2. Then uses the decrypted timestamp to again decrypt the data,
which is the expensive step in our protocol.
For a write (Figure 4.6), PMC encrypts data and address; while MMC decrypts address
both using pre-computed OTPs. Thus, only XOR operations are on the critical path.
For authentication, a Galois Field multiplication and an XOR operation are also needed
per ciphertext (Section 4.4.1.1). Read/write requests/responses require address and either
data or dummy data tag generation on both PMC and MMC side. Dummy data tag genera-
tion can be avoided on receiving side. For a read response, MMC first checks the tag read
from DRAM and generates another tag on double encrypted data for transmission. We can
overlap some of these operations with data (and address) encryption/decryption.
4.4.3 InvisiMem near Security Protocol
The protocol for near-memory secure processor involves data encryption and authen-
tication tag generation on a write. A read requires data decryption, and authentication
tag generation and check. While authentication delay is added to critical path for a write
request, a read response overlaps it with data decryption.
4.4.4 Storing Meta-Data in Smart Memory
Meta-data for a cache block consists of 64-bit timestamp value (DTS1) and an integrity
tag. Section 4.3.6 described two designs for storing this meta-data: fragmented and non-
77
DATA
64
(a)
WASTE
8 40
Memory Block (128 bytes)
64
TIMESTAMP
16
TAG
Memory Block (64 bytes)
DATA - 0 DATA - 1
TIMESTAMP TAG
(b)
Figure 4.7: (a) Fragmented Design (b) Non-fragmented Design
fragmented.
Figure 4.7 (a) depicts fragmented layout. Storing data and its metadata together requires
88 bytes (64 data, 8 timestamp, 16 tag). HMC Specification [12] mandates that memory
block sizes can be 32/64/128/256 bytes. Therefore, in the fragmented layout, 88-byte data
block and its meta-data consumes 128-bytes, resulting in effective memory utilization of
68.75%.
Figure 4.7(b) depicts non-fragmented layout, where meta-data and data are not stored
together. A 64 byte block can store meta-data for two data blocks (2 timestamps and 2 tags).
This leads to a far better memory utilization of 91.66%. To exploit vault-level parallelism,
our data mapper places data block and its meta-data in different vaults, so that they can be
accessed in parallel. We also take care that meta-data of spatially adjacent data blocks are
mapped to different meta-data blocks. Memory waits for both data and metadata before
responding to a request from PMC.
4.5 Evaluation
4.5.1 Methodology
We study 22 benchmarks from SPEC 2006 [67] suite with reference inputs. We use
the Simpoint [129] methodology with interval size of 100 million instructions to choose
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Configuration 4 cores, commit width 4, 72 entry LQ, 42 entry SQ
Processor Near Memory: 2.5 GHz out-of-order core
Far Memory: 4 GHz out-of-order core
L1-I/D Cache 32KB, 8-way, 4 cycle access
L2 Cache inclusive, private, 256KB, 8-way,11 cycle access
L3 Cache inclusive, shared, 8MB, 16-way, 40 cycles
Interconnect Split Bus, 6 cycles, arbitrate latency: 1 cycle
DRAM 4GB, 2 channels, tCL = tRCD = tRP = 13.75ns,
tCk=1.25ns
3D Memory 4GB, 32 vaults [12], 128 TSV’s per vault @2Gb/s [72]
Off-chip links 4 SerDes links, 16 lanes per link, direction [12]
Table 4.2: Processor and memory model.
Benchmark LLC MPKI IPC Benchmark LLC MPKI IPC
povray 0.06 0.94 perlbench (perl) 1.42 1.20
gamess 0.1 1.33 gcc 1.49 0.65
namd 0.13 1.13 cactusADM 3.58 0.71
(cactus)
hmmer 0.26 1.08 zeusmp 4.02 0.84
calculix 0.31 1.17 bwaves 10.32 0.69
gobmk 0.34 0.93 leslie3d (leslie) 17.53 0.38
h264ref 0.43 1.21 GemsFDTD (Gems) 20.25 0.27
gromacs 0.46 0.76 milc 20.58 0.45
sjeng 0.47 0.86 soplex 25.93 0.27
tonto 0.54 1.01 libquantum (libq) 33.06 0.32
bzip2 0.55 0.75 mcf 40.67 0.15
Table 4.3: LLC MPKI and IPC for DRAM hp.
representative execution samples. Table 4.3 reports the LLC misses per kilo instructions
(MPKI) and IPC values for DRAM hp (unsecure baseline without smart memory).
Processor Model: We modeled our processor designs (Table 4.2) using MARSSx86 [105],
a full system cycle accurate simulator. Processor in InvisiMem far is similar to Intel Quad
Core i7-4790K processor [13]. InvisiMem near places secure processor in the logic die of
smart memory. Eckert et al. [51] investigated power dissipation possible in the logic layer
of smart memory under various cooling solutions. They conclude that with an active heat
sink, the power dissipated can be as high as 55W without affecting memory die tempera-
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Design Read-Req Read-Resp Write-Req Write-Resp
Baseline 16 80 80 16
InvisiMem far 112 120 112 120
Table 4.4: Request and response packet sizes (in bytes).
tures adversely. Hence, we model InvisiMem near as Intel i7-3770T [11] at 2.5GHz and
45W.
Latency of Cryptographic Primitives: We synthesized a pipelined AES core from
OpenCores [17] at 45nm and scaled it using ITRS projections to model its latency in our
system. The Galois Field multiplication (authenticated encryption) is a combinational cir-
cuit that operates in single cycle [123, 152].
Power Model: We model processor power using McPAT [90] and AES energy to be
302 pJ [95] per 128-bit block. For baseline DRAM, we model access energy to be 65
pJ/bit [72]. A recent industry prototype [72] reports 10.48pJ/bit for HMC access of which
43% is attributed to SerDes circuits [72, 109], rest is for DRAM access and logic layer. We
model 1.42W for DRAM static power.
Smart Memory Model: We use DRAMSIM2 [118] to model 4GB of DRAM memory
for baseline (DRAM hp). We modify DRAMSIM2 to model a 4GB 3D-stacked mem-
ory with 32 vaults and 128 TSVs (through silicon vias) per vault [12]. We assume the
same DRAM device parameters (Table 4.2) for both traditional DRAM and 3D-stacked
memory. However, we assume a DRAM clock in line with TSV signaling rate for smart
memory [72].
Table 4.4 shows packet sizes communicated in baseline [12] and InvisiMem far. Each
packet has 8-bytes of header and tail, which carry useful meta-data like command, address
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etc. Hence, read request or write response is 16 bytes in size. Write requests and read
responses carry 64 bytes of data as well. In our design read/write requests also transmit au-
thentication tags (16 bytes for packet header/tail, 16 bytes for data). Responses additionally
carry data timestamp (8 bytes).
4.5.2 Unsecure Smart Memory Performance and Energy
Figure 4.8 shows the performance overhead with respect to unsecure baseline DRAM -
hp of various designs modeled with increasing security guarantees. We plot the benchmarks
in the increasing order of their LLC miss rates. The 3D far design represents an unsecure
high power processor connected to smart memory. High bandwidth smart memory helps
improve performance of memory intensive programs (GemsFDTD sees gain of 31.41%).
On average, smart memory delivers performance improvement of 4.02%.
Figure 4.9 shows the energy overhead of 3D far design (average 24.98%). While the
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DRAM energy is lower for smart memory, the static power expended by the SerDes links is
the chief cause of this overhead. High static power is caused as SerDes links transmit null
packets when idle [12]. Prior work also observes that SerDes link power is a significant
fraction of the total HMC power [21, 109, 59].
4.5.3 Far InvisiMem
This section discusses performance and energy overheads of our InvisiMem far designs
to guarantee security properties equivalent to ORAM, data integrity, freshness, and also
avoid leaking timing of memory events.
3D far+DE configuration in Figure 4.8 adds data encryption (DE) to 3D far design.
This model helps us tease out data encryption overheads (incurred in secure processors like
Intel SGX) from the address encryption overheads. Adding data encryption incurs modest
overhead of 2.58% on average.
To tease out the overhead of providing ORAM guarantees from the other security guar-
antees, we model InvisiMem far (no DI) configuration which provides only ORAM guar-
antee. In this design we encrypt both address and data, but authenticate only address. This
increases the overhead from 2.58% (3D far+DE) to mere 5.55%.
The InvisiMem far configuration depicts the design which has ORAM, data integrity
and freshness guarantees, but no defense against the timing channel. InvisiMem far design,
incurs an average overhead of 10.81% (highest overhead for bwaves of 52.65%). This is a
significant improvement over prior ORAM-based solutions [56], which also require addi-
tional hardware support for tracking and checking version numbers of memory blocks. The
InvisiMem far configuration which does not leak the timing of memory events is depicted
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as InvisiMem far+Timing (Section 4.5.4). This design increases the average overhead from
10.81% to 14.21%.
Figure 4.9 shows the energy overheads of InvisiMem far. Without timing channel
defense, InvisiMem far increases the energy overhead of 3D far design from 24.98% to
34.38%; with it the overhead is 53.03%. This is a sharp contrast to prior works which in-
cur one to two orders of performance loss, bandwidth increase, and commensurate energy
overhead.
4.5.4 Static Packet Rate for Timing Channel
As discussed in Section 4.3.4, we choose a static request and response rate to address
timing channel leaks. We provide here the empirical evidence to support this choice. Fig-
ure 4.10 depicts energy delay squared (ED2) overhead of various static packet rates with
respect to InvisiMem far without timing channel protection. To depict spectrum of behav-
83
 0
 10
 20
gcc mcf avg
ov
er
he
ad
(%
)
30cycles
Predictor
(a) Performance
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 120
gcc mcf avg
ov
er
he
ad
(%
)
30cycles
Predictor
(b) Total Energy
Figure 4.12: Comparison to dynamic scheme.
iors, we pick two least and most memory intensive benchmarks, and two benchmarks with
highest and lowest IPC.
We see that the lowest (ED2) overhead occurs roughly at 30-cycles for all these diverse
programs. The reason is that energy consumed by cryptographic units to process dummy
packets stops being a significant fraction of system power as packet interval increases be-
yond about 30-70 cycles. As SerDes links constantly send null packets even when they
are idle, there is not much to be gained by increasing the packet interval beyond this sweet
point. This combined effect is depicted in Figure 4.11 (averaged across six benchmarks
under study) wherein energy overheads first start to drop before showing a negative trend.
We also implemented a dynamic predictor [57] (ED2 overhead of 165.58%) with rates
(30, 60, 120, 240). Figure 4.12 compares this predictor to our static scheme with 30 cy-
cles (ED2 overhead of 159.73%). We show low (gcc) and high (mcf) LLC MPKI rate
benchmarks, and also average for all the programs. As these results show there is not a sig-
nificant potential for performance improvements or energy savings with a dynamic scheme.
Considering it has a weaker security guarantee, we chose a static rate.
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4.5.5 Near InvisiMem
Figure 4.13 shows the performance overhead of two near-memory processor designs
we model, with and without security guarantees (We depict outlier benchmarks only for
space considerations). A low-power processor stacked with memory layers is depicted
as 3D near. Compared to high-performance far processor, it has an average overhead
of 13.56%. Compute intensive benchmarks exhibit overheads (44.23% for calculix),
whereas memory-intensive benchmarks see performance gains (GemsFDTD, 26.43%). In-
visiMem near which encrypts data and authenticates it on reads adds about 11% overhead
to 3D near design. To model the scenario where it may be feasible to connect a high
performance core to memory through secure silicon interposer, we depict 3D near hp and
InvisiMem near hp. For such a design, the average overhead of providing data encryption
and integrity is a mere 1.41%.
4.5.6 Memory Space Overhead
Table 4.5 lists the space overheads of a recent ORAM-based proposal Freecursive-
ORAM [56] and InvisiMem far for various security guarantees. For both designs we report
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Guarantee Encryption ORAM Integrity
Freecursive ORAM [56] 256MB 5.8GB 2GB
InvisiMem far 512MB 0B 1GB
Table 4.5: Memory space overheads.
space overheads for 4GB of real data with 64 bytes block size.
InvisiMem far incurs more space overhead to store encryption timestamps as these are
per cache block. In contrast, in Freecursive-ORAM, these timestamps are per bucket which
comprises of multiple cache blocks. However, this reduction in space overhead has con-
comitant performance, energy and bandwidth cost as buckets have to be read and written in
their entirety. InvisiMem far incurs no space overhead for ORAM guarantees. Freecursive-
ORAM, on the other hand, incurs close to 100% space overhead to store dummy data blocks
and other metadata needed to implement the ORAM algorithm. Finally, for data integrity,
Freecursive-ORAM has higher overheads as it needs tags for dummy cache blocks as well.
4.5.7 Fragmented Vs Non-Fragmented
Section 4.4.4 discussed two ways in which a memory block and its metadata (times-
tamp/tag) can be stored and retrieved from memory. Non-fragmented design has better
memory utilization than fragmented design. However, it also breaks every memory request
into requests for data and metadata. Owing to vault-level parallelism and our data mapping
policy (Section 4.4.4) we see that the average overhead of InvisiMem far only increases
from 7.24% in fragmented design to 10.81% in non-fragmented design. Given its better
memory utilization and negligible performance difference, we chose the memory layout of
non-fragmented design for all our experiments.
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4.6 Related Work
InvisiMem is the first work that uses smart memory based solution for memory bus side
channel.
4.6.1 3D Stacking for Security
Only two prior proposals [140, 63] harness 3D-stacking to provide security guaran-
tees. In [140] a control plane is integrated with a conventional processor in a 3D stack
which provides security functionalities like monitoring activities of the processor to pre-
vent cache-side channel attacks. In [63], the authors leverage smart memory logic to
efficiently implement Bonsai Merkle Tree [117]. Our work obviates need for Merkle trees
by using memory isolation provided by Intel SGX and employing authenticated encryption
between processor and memory. Both prior works did not harness smart memories to solve
address side channel or timing channel.
Concurrent to our work, ObfusMem [25] also uses smart memory to provide ORAM-
equivalent guarantee. InvisiMem provides a stronger memory-trace obliviousness (MTO)
guarantee [91] by hiding memory access and response times using constant rate messages.
4.6.2 Secure Hardware
Several secure hardware proposals [138, 9, 61, 136, 31] exist which chiefly aim to
provide isolation (protect sensitive application from other applications and untrusted sys-
tem software) and software attestation. The latest proposal: Intel SGX [97, 23], provides
isolated execution, and reduces the trusted computing base to the application and few privi-
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leged containers. It also provides encryption, data integrity and freshness guarantees. There
are other proposals with similar or more security guarantees like SGX [36, 52, 40]. None
of these proposals address memory bus side channel.
We discussed solutions [91, 160, 56] that provide defenses against memory bus side
channel in Section 4.2. They incur order of magnitude more memory accesses and result
in huge performance overheads. We show in this work that with smart memory, memory
bus side channel can be solved with low overheads. Prior works have also considered
sending memory requests from the processor at a static [55] or dynamic [57] rate. Both
rely on ORAM algorithm to generate indistinguishable real and dummy requests. Our
timing solution does not rely on ORAM-algorithm. By employing smart memory it can
generate constant response rate to hide response time variations. It can avoid processing
dummy requests in memory, saving energy. Also, unlike prior schemes [57], our solution
is not limited to only one pending memory request at any time.
Prior works [143, 127] address information leakage when an untrusted program shares
the memory system with a trusted application. Wang et al. [143] extended memory con-
troller to allocate fixed time quantum for each thread when they can issue memory accesses.
It does not hide when a thread issues requests or receives responses within its time quantum
from an adversary who has physical access to memory bus. Shafiee et al. [127] proposed to
issue a real or dummy request every Q cycles for each thread, and architected a determin-
istic memory that guaranteed a response before the interval ends. Deterministic memory
forgoes optimizations such as row-buffer hits. Unlike InvisiMem, it does not hide type of
memory access (read or write). Also, InvisiMem leverages packetized interface of smart
memory to support constant rate responses without requiring any changes to DRAM de-
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sign, and is more efficient.
Optimizing Memory Encryption: Prior works propose several optimizations to re-
duce memory encryption overheads which can be used in our design. In [130], the authors
predict encryption counters for speculative OTP pre-computation. In [153, 152], encryp-
tion counters are cached which can also further reduce our overheads.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter proposed InvisiMem, which harnesses smart memory with compute ca-
pability to simplify solutions for providing address and data confidentiality, data integrity,
freshness, and also closes the memory bus timing channel. By including logic layer of
smart memory in the trusted computing base, we demonstrate how each of the above guar-
antees can be obtained at order of magnitude lower overheads for performance, space,
energy and memory bandwidth, when compared to prior solutions that relied on expensive
constructs like Oblivious RAM and Merkle trees.
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CHAPTER V
Sanctuary: Efficient Page Fault Channel Defense
Previous chapter discussed how an attacker can learn the address trace of an application
by snooping the addresses off the bus and a low-overhead defense against this side-channel.
A related vulnerability that commercial secure processors like Intel SGX suffer from is
page fault side channel. A malicious OS uses the page fault mechanism to induce faults
at each memory access to learn the address trace of the application. This chapter presents
Sanctuary, a low-overhead page fault channel defense which provisions operating system
with flexibility to manage memory as a resource, yet prevents the OS from using page
faults to learn an application’s address trace. Our solution relies on near-memory page
movements to keep it’s overheads low. Together with InvisiMem (Chapter IV), Sanctuary
secures the address trace of an application from leaking and leads to more secure systems
at low overheads.
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Figure 5.1: Memory organization under SGX (a) and under Sanctuary (b). CFI: Confiden-
tiality, Freshness, Integrity
5.1 Introduction
Reliance on cloud computing for it’s myriad benefits has led to increased demand for
preserving the privacy of cloud computing client’s data and computations. Intel Software
Guard Extensions (SGX) [23, 97] is the latest commercially available secure processor
offering which aims to answer the increased demand for privacy preserving remote com-
putations. With SGX, a cloud user can designate parts of his application as private or
sensitive (termed enclave) and the SGX-enabled processor will isolate code and data of
this enclave from the rest of the system, including the application’s public functions, sys-
tem software, and hardware peripherals. A SGX enclave accesses its code/data by placing
it in a partition of physical memory that SGX reserves at boot time termed EPC (Enclave
Page Cache, Figure 5.1). Once a page in this partition is allocated to an enclave, SGX pro-
visions checks to ensure this page is isolated from the rest system; only the owing enclave
can read/write to the page.
The size of EPC is limited under SGX (128MB in current SGX processors) to keep
metadata space and performance overheads under check which largely depend on EPC size.
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Security guarantees for EPC are provided at cache-block granularity; every cache-block is
encrypted (confidentiality), has associated MAC tag (integrity:prevent data corruption) and
additional metadata to preserve freshness (read returns latest written value). Limited EPC
size can cause sensitive pages to be spilled outside EPC. SGX provides similar security
guarantees (Figure 5.1) to enclave’s sensitive pages regardless of the memory partition
they are stored in albeit at different granularities. When a page is being spilled from EPC
to non-EPC memory, SGX encrypts the page for confidentiality, creates a single MAC tag
for data integrity and uses a nonce for freshness. Unlike EPC, sensitive pages in non-EPC
memory do not have isolation. In order for an enclave to access a spilled page, it has to be
moved back to EPC. Such page movements are done by the OS using SGX instructions.
While the security guarantees provided by SGX for sensitive pages of an enclave are
strong, SGX leaves page management entirely to the OS. The OS can allocate pages in
EPC to enclaves, deallocate them at will and spill them to non-EPC memory. Furthermore,
address translations (virtual to physical) are also under OS’s purview. As such, OS handles
TLB misses, accesses and updates page tables for enclaves.
As SGX leaves page management to the OS, a malicious OS can simply revoke page
permissions to induce spurious page faults during enclave execution. Using this mecha-
nism, the OS can learn the address trace of an enclave. This security vulnerability, termed
page fault channel [151] can be used to recover sensitive inputs of an application [151, 163].
Specifically, prior work [151] showed how the sensitive input image to an enclave can be
completely recovered. This can have catastrophic consequences say for a medical image
processing cloud application.
Current solutions to fix page fault channel [40] propose to reserve all memory needed
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by an enclave a priori and revoke OS’s ability to perform address translations and mem-
ory deallocations during enclave’s execution. This is undesirable from both enclave’s and
operating system’s perspective. For the enclave, predetermining memory requirement is
only possible either by severely limiting enclave’s behavior (no dynamic memory alloca-
tions, no recursion etc.) or by reserving large amounts of memory a priori. The latter case
can cause information leak if enclave memory requirement at runtime exceeds the reserved
memory size leading to OS controlled paging activity. For the OS, disallowing memory
deallocations robs the OS of it’s flexibility in managing memory as a resource.
In this chapter, we propose Sanctuary, a page fault channel defense in which unlike
prior solutions we allow OS to allocate memory on-demand and also deallocate memory
during enclave’s execution. Unlike baseline SGX, where OS is in complete control of page
management for an enclave, under Sanctuary, while OS still retains complete control over
allocations, EPC deallocations and page movements between EPC and non-EPC memory
are performed by a secure runtime in collaboration with the OS. The runtime secures its
transactions (hides addresses) with the OS via a novel construct termed Oblivious Page
Management (OPAM) which is derived from Oblivious RAM (ORAM) [60] but is cus-
tomized for the properties of page management for enclaves. The runtime is also responsi-
ble for securing address translations for enclave’s sensitive pages. As OPAM transactions
are costly, we reduce their number by creating a novel memory partition termed EPC-lite
which has similar guarantees to EPC but does not incur the overheads of actually increasing
EPC size.
Oblivious page management (OPAM): Under both baseline SGX and Sanctuary, OS
retains the ability to deallocate non-EPC memory pages and swap them to a backing store.
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A malicious OS can use this to revoke permissions on non-EPC memory pages and learn the
address trace of an enclave. To prevent this, under Sanctuary, the secure runtime obfuscates
the addresses accessed in non-EPC memory via ORAM construct.
ORAM is a cryptographic primitive which makes a memory access pattern compu-
tationally indistinguishable from a random access pattern of same length. To do so, it
maintains a randomized mapping between each logical page and its physical location in
memory (position-map) and also reshuffles pages in memory on each access. While
several ORAM realizations exist, we focus on path-ORAM [135] in this work which orga-
nizes memory as a binary tree. We customize the traditional ORAM implementation for
our context and term the resultant implementation oblivious page management (OPAM).
Reducing position-map overheads: A key structure which supports ORAM algorithm
is position-map which stores mappings between a logical page and it’s physical loca-
tion in memory. Access to this structure is required for each ORAM access and is on the
critical path. By encoding position map data inside page tables we show how we can do
away with both the space and performance overheads of accessing this structure.
Dynamic ORAM: Prior solutions protect fixed memory size using ORAM construct.
However, as we support on-demand memory allocation for an enclave, the amount of non-
EPC memory needed by an enclave can grow/shrink over time necessitating an ORAM
construct which supports this feature. While such dynamic ORAMs have been theoretically
studied, our work realizes the first efficient implementation for them. We address several
challenges that arise to support this feature like maintaining consistency of position map
structure as the ORAM tree grows and also identify interesting opportunities like choosing
which tree paths to grow to improve ORAM efficiency.
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Dataless and efficient stash: Each access to ORAM tree is modeled as a read and
write of all pages on a path in the tree. Due to the nature of the ORAM algorithm, on a
path write, it is possible that not all read pages can be spilled back to the tree. Such failed
spill pages are tracked in a stash structure. To keep the memory footprint low for stash,
traditional algorithms periodically issue dummy ORAM accesses (access random paths in
tree) which add to overheads. Sanctuary reduces stash footprint by making it dataless; on
a spill failure, we simply track few bytes of metadata and pick a new victim page to spill.
Further, each ORAM access also attempts to spill pages in stash and we come up with
efficient mechanisms to do so for our context.
Thin nodes: Each ORAM access accesses multiple pages (accessed path) in order to
hide the specific page which was accessed. While reducing the node width (pages per node)
in an ORAM tree can reduce its overheads, such thin nodes are more susceptible to ORAM
spill failures. We show how by smartly growing the ORAM tree and our dataless stash
implementation help us to both reduce spill failures and be more resilient to them. This
allows us to realize thin nodes and reap their lower overheads.
Near-memory page movements: The chief source of overhead for an ORAM access
is that several pages are read and written on each ORAM access. The net effect of each
such access is that either a page is spilled from EPC to non-EPC memory or fetched from
non-EPC memory to EPC while rest of the pages are simply moved in non-EPC mem-
ory. Performing these page moves using traditional loads/stores will cause cache pollution
besides incurring huge overheads. Instead, we perform these page movements in a hard-
ware unit close to the memory controller. This accelerates these page moves, avoids cache
pollution and lowers overhead of each ORAM access.
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EPC-lite to reduce OPAM transactions: While OPAM considerably reduces baseline
ORAM algorithm overheads, each OPAM transaction is still costly. As these transactions
are required only while accessing non-EPC memory, we could reduce their number by
increasing EPC. Increasing EPC size, however, is challenging as SGX provides security
guarantees for EPC pages at cache block granularity. As such, any increase in EPC size
will incur additional performance and space overheads for maintaining and accessing the
metadata needed for providing these guarantees. Instead, Sanctuary extends EPC without
incurring metadata overheads by devising a memory partition which has all the security
properties of EPC except at page-level. We term this novel memory partition as EPC-
lite. Secure runtime can move pages between EPC-lite and EPC without needing OPAM
transactions. We identify challenges in supporting EPC-lite region and propose simple
solutions to address these challenges.
We model a suite of cloud computing applications: genome processing, vision applica-
tions, graph processing, and in-memory key value store which frequently process sensitive
data including but not limited to medical images, genome sequences and social graphs.
We demonstrate how page fault channel can be fixed with reasonable overheads for these
applications.
5.2 Motivation and Background
5.2.1 Intel SGX
Intel SGX [23, 97] provisions instruction set extensions which rely on hardware support
to provide isolated execution to an application. An application developer intending to create
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an SGX application, first needs to identify data that is sensitive, data structures which hold
this data and code that operates on these structures and place them in a separate trusted
library termed as enclave [14]. SGX guarantees that as long as hardware is not tampered
with, any memory claimed by the enclave is encrypted and its integrity is checked. SGX
adds additional checks to prevent malicious system software (operating system, hypervisor)
or other applications in the system from accessing the memory claimed by the enclave.
While an adversary can corrupt the enclave memory using physical probing of memory,
any such data corruption will be detected using integrity checks of SGX.
While a promising solution, Intel SGX is susceptible to several vulnerabilities. The
vulnerability that we focus on in this work is page fault side channel [151]. As SGX
leaves virtual memory management entirely under the purview of the OS, a malicious OS
can manipulate page tables to induce spurious page faults and learn the page-level address
trace of an application. Prior works [151] show how this channel can be used to recover
sensitive inputs to an application.
5.2.2 Threat Model
We assume a secure processor with support for isolated execution like Intel SGX. Our
attack model assumes a powerful adversary with full control over the operating system. We
assume that the entire application is bundled as an enclave (along with necessary libraries)
and it’s interactions with external world are made secure i.e. the enclave is protected against
attacks like Iago attacks [32]. We consider other side channels like cache [155], power [85],
thermal [110], program execution time [158] outside the scope of this work.
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Figure 5.2: Accessing block a involves read and write of path to leaf to which the block
is mapped. (a) Depicts stash after end of path read. (b) Depicts stash after end of path
write. Block with dummy data is represented as φ.
5.2.3 Path Oblivious RAM
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a cryptographic construct which makes a memory trace
computationally indistinguishable from a random access trace of same length. While there
are several ORAM construct realizations, we employ path-ORAM [135] which is the most
practical implementation of this construct. In this section we explain the workings of path-
ORAM algorithm (henceforth referred to simply as ORAM).
ORAM organizes memory as a binary tree and each node in the tree has fixed num-
ber of slots (z) each capable of storing a single data block. The tree also has associated
utilization factor which indicates percentage of real blocks that can be stored in the
tree; remaining blocks hold dummy data. The algorithm maps each real block to a leaf
in the tree and these mappings are maintained in the position-map structure. All the
blocks (real and dummy) are stored in encrypted form in memory. The tree also stores
metadata for every block which includes its block-id (null for dummy blocks), its leaf and
encryption related counter.
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Figure 5.2 depicts steps involved while reading block a. The algorithm first looks
up the position-map to find the leaf the block is mapped to ( 1 ). The ORAM invariant
is that block a will either be in the stash structure the algorithm maintains or in some
slot along the path to it’s mapped leaf (path-0). Next, it accesses path-0 and decrypts
all blocks along the path ( 2 ), storing only real blocks in the stash structure ( 3 ). At
this point, block a is read and remapped to a random leaf ( 4 ). Next, as many blocks
as possible are encrypted and written back to path-0 and rest of the slots are filled with
dummy blocks ( 5 ). While writing back a path, data blocks are pushed as close to leaf
nodes as possible (block c moves to leaf node). Notice that block a is left behind in
the stash. This is so, as it is now mapped to leaf 3 and the only common node between
path-0 and path-3 is the root node which is currently full. A write operation proceeds
similarly except that the block will be read and updated.
ORAM’s security relies on two actions. First, mapping of blocks to random leafs on
each access causes new set of blocks to be read each time a block is accessed. Second,
each access causes re-encryption of all blocks accessed which makes it hard for an adver-
sary to differentiate between real and dummy blocks and deduce which block was actually
accessed.
Note that ORAM is susceptible to failures. Most secure processor implementations
provision stash as an on-chip structure and a stash overflow due accumulation of blocks
causes ORAM failure. So as to reduce this probability, on every ORAM access, data blocks
are pushed as close to leaf nodes as possible to free up higher level nodes which can store
blocks mapped to larger set of leaves.
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5.3 Sanctuary Design
This section gives details about three main components of Sanctuary’s design: secure
runtime, oblivious page management (OPAM) construct and EPC-lite memory.
5.3.1 Secure Runtime
The secure runtime is responsible for address translations for enclave’s sensitive pages.
All page faults incurred by an enclave are delivered to the secure runtime which performs
the page table walk to read/update enclave’s page tables. Further enclave’s page tables are
stored in enclave’s sensitive pages so as to prevent malicious updates to them.
It is necessary to direct TLB misses to enclave’s sensitive pages to enclave’s page ta-
bles(stored securely and isolated) whereas misses to non-sensitive pages continue to use
OS managed page tables. This necessitates enabling a dual page table walk mechanism.
Such support has been extensively studied by prior work [40] and can be adopted in our
system. In essence, this requires an additional page table base register which points to the
physical address of enclave’s page tables. Under SGX, programmer explicitly demarcates
range of virtual addresses of an application as being sensitive and any address translation
for this range can be directed to the enclave’s page tables.
Under Sanctuary, the secure runtime also performs page management in collaboration
with the OS. This includes making page management decisions on behalf of the enclave
and securely performing page movements between EPC and non-EPC memory using our
OPAM construct (Section 5.3.2). At enclave load, the secure runtime attempts to load the
enclave’s code and data section pages in EPC. If enough EPC is not present, these pages
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are allocated in non-EPC memory. The secure runtime also reserves some pages for stack
and heap sections. Profiling can be employed to figure out the number of pages to be set
aside for these sections.
On a TLB miss, the secure runtime performs a page table walk. If the miss is due to
a page present in EPC, the page table entry is simply loaded in TLB. If however the miss
is due to a stack/heap page which was never allocated before, the secure runtime requests
OS to allocate an EPC page. If a new EPC page is not available, the secure runtime picks a
victim EPC page from the EPC pages allocated to the faulting enclave, spills it to non-EPC
memory to make space in EPC and allocates it to the faulting address. Note that, during a
spill to non-EPC memory, the secure runtime may need to request more non-EPC memory
pages from the OS. If the miss is caused by a code/data section page or stack/heap page
which was previously allocated but was spilled to non-EPC memory, the secure runtime
will fetch the page in EPC which could also require an EPC page to spilled to make space
for incoming non-EPC memory page.
5.3.2 Oblivious Page Management
In this section we discuss how we customize the traditional ORAM construct (Sec-
tion 5.2.3) to be more suitable for page management context. We term our customized
construct Oblivious Page Management (OPAM). Our secure runtime uses this construct to
support page movements between EPC and non-EPC memory.
Sanctuary organizes the non-EPC memory pages belonging to an enclave as a binary
tree as in traditional ORAM construct. The secure runtime can request allocations of non-
EPC memory pages for an enclave. The OS can swap any non-EPC memory page to the
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Figure 5.3: Sanctuary page table entries (PTE). A virtual address maps to EPC or non-EPC
memory. For the former, PTE is as before (a) consisting of physical page number and PTE
metadata. For the latter, we store leaf and tree level (b). This allows about 8TB of non-EPC
memory per enclave.
backing store. However, on an access to the tree, the OS ensures all non-EPC memory
pages on the accessed path are resident in memory and we provision mechanisms for the
secure runtime to check this (Section 5.4.1.1). We discuss next our customizations to the
traditional ORAM construct.
5.3.2.1 Page table as Position Map
Traditional ORAM algorithm requires a position map which tracks mapping be-
tween a page and leaf. One of the chief overheads of ORAM algorithm is the perfor-
mance and space overheads associated with position map. We do away with these
overheads by encoding position map data inside page table entries. On a TLB miss,
page tables are already accessed and as such there is no performance overhead for accessing
position map data. Figure 5.3 depicts this encoding where an enclave page is either
mapped to EPC in which case the page table entry (PTE) stores conventional information
(physical page number and PTE metadata). However, if the enclave page is mapped to non-
EPC memory, the PTE stores the leaf to which the page is mapped. Assuming x86-based
architecture, close to 36 bits are available of which we use 31 bits to store leaf information.
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5.3.2.2 Dynamic ORAM
Traditional ORAM algorithm supports fixed memory size. In our context, predetermin-
ing total number of non-EPC memory pages needed by an enclave a priori is hard. Further-
more, reserving large number of non-EPC memory pages would imply a large OPAM tree.
As the overhead of each OPAM access largely correlates to the tree size this would in turn
would translate to large overheads. As a consequence, unlike in traditional ORAM, in our
context it makes sense to grow the OPAM tree on-demand. While prior works [98] study
such dynamic ORAMs theoretically, we identify several challenges in practically imple-
menting this feature and present solutions to identified challenges. Note that, OPAM tree
can also be shrunk as enclave frees memory. While desirable, we leave this to future work
and only focus on growing the tree efficiently in this work.
Add page x
at leaf 7
0 1 2 3
leaf-ids
Node w/ data
Node w/ dummy data
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
page x
Figure 5.4: Smart growth. Adding nodes to a full tree (50% utilization). Naive growth adds
nodes gradually from left to right which will cause the page addition to fail as path to leaf 7
is full. Smart growth prioritizes adding nodes to path which is accessed. As a consequence,
the addition succeeds.
Growth Size: An interesting choice with dynamic ORAMs is when and by how much
to grow the tree. Former is guided by the utilization factor (Section 5.2.3) which
dictates the fraction of pages in the tree that can hold real data. Sanctuary adds nodes to
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the tree at a spill to non-EPC memory which will cause the utilization factor to be
exceeded. We add as many nodes so as to ensure that even after adding a new real page the
utilization factor is not exceeded.
Smart Growth: While prior works [98] discuss gradual node addition to an ORAM tree,
our work observes a unique opportunity that exists in deciding where to add these nodes.
Figure 5.4 depicts a scenario wherein we are trying to add a page x to a full tree (utilization
factor of 50%, has three real pages). As discussed above, at this point we will add two
nodes to this tree so that post addition of page x the utilization factor is maintained. A
naive growth strategy could add nodes left to right in a level and in this case cause the spill
of page x to fail as path to leaf 7 is full.
Instead, in Sanctuary, we take a different approach which we term as Smart Growth.
Under this optimization, when we attempt to grow the tree, we first try to add nodes to the
path we are accessing. In this case, this causes nodes to be added to path to leaf 7 causing
the spill of page x to succeed. If the path being accessed is already grown, we simply revert
to adding nodes from left to right. We track a bit vector for last tree level to remember
which paths have been grown so far and which need growing. Our evaluation shows that
by prioritizing adding space to where it is needed the most, smart growth helps us reduce
spill failures considerably.
Smart growth preserves the security of ORAM construct and the adversary does not
learn anything new in smart growth as compared to naive growth. In both growth strategies
the adversary only learns that the tree is being grown and which path in the tree is being
accessed. By making node addition independent of current tree contents, smart growth
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Figure 5.5: Finding page 10 in new tree which was mapped to leaf 3 in old tree. We employ
deterministic remapping; even addresses get remapped to right paths and odd addresses to
left paths. We also remember tree level with the mapping. To find the page, we find leaf in
tree with #old levels and traverse the tree in relevant direction based on address.
does not leak any further information. Smart growth is independent of tree contents as
regardless of occupancy of path being accessed, we still grow accessed path if we need to
grow the tree and current path can be grown.
Avoiding Position Map Updates: One of the key challenge in realizing dynamic ORAM
is position map consistency in which the leaf mapping stored in position map does not
suffice in deducing which path in the tree is to be accessed. Position map consistency is
affected in two scenarios: number of levels in the tree changes and when pages are shuffled
at each access. Figure 5.5 depicts the former. When levels in a tree change, the #leafs in
the tree change. The tree on the left has four leaves while on the right has eight leaves.
The paths to leaf 3 in both the trees are vastly different. Also, page shuffling done on each
access to the tree pushes data as close to leaf as possible. When the tree grows, two leafs
are created where originally there was one leaf. We would like to spread old data over both
leaves on page shuffling causing remapping of pages (update to leaf) needing position map
updates. In the extreme case, we could iterate over all affected position map entries and
105
update them. This can have severe overheads as it will lead to random page table walks.
In Sanctuary, we employ two strategies which help us grow the tree and shuffle pages
without needing to update the position map. First, we modify our position map entry to also
store tree level as depicted in Figure 5.3. The leaf and tree level are stored the first time
the entry it inserted in the page table. Also, during page shuffling, we employ deterministic
remapping of pages. We remap pages with even addresses to even paths and odd addresses
to odd paths. With these strategies, during accessing a page, we first use the levels stored
in position map to identify leaf in the tree with stored #levels and then pick either the
right-most leaf (even addresses) or left-most leaf (odd addresses) to identify the path to be
accessed. Figure 5.5 shows an example.
5.3.2.3 Reducing Page Copies between EPC and non-EPC memory
In traditional ORAM implementations, on each tree access, all the pages on the ac-
cessed path are first decrypted and moved to stash (secure space) and then, as many
pages in the stash as possible are written back. In our context, implementing this as-is
would incur several page copies between EPC and non-EPC memory as the stash has to
be in EPC. Such page copies are costly as SGX provides security guarantees at different
granularity for EPC (cache-block level) and non-EPC memory (page level). As such, page
copies have to transform metadata needed for these security guarantees (non-EPC memory
to EPC: page level to cache-block level and vice versa). Note that, the net effect of tree
access is that on each spill to non-EPC memory or fetch from non-EPC memory, only
a single page actually needs to be copied between EPC and non-EPC memory while rest
of the pages on the path only get shuffled in non-EPC memory.
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So as to reduce these page copies, we harness our key observation that we only need
to inspect OPAM metadata to deduce the page movement decisions and we need not move
page data between non-EPC memory and EPC to get the net effect of an OPAM access.
Recall that every page in OPAM tree has associated metadata (virtual address of page,
leaf, level). We store this metadata separately from actual page data in a mirrored OPAM
tree. We first access this data to deduce page copy decisions and subsequently copy one
page between EPC and non-EPC memory (spill: EPC to non-EPC memory or fetch: non-
EPC memory to EPC) and rest of the pages are simply moved within non-EPC memory
(non-EPC memory to non-EPC memory). Our decoupling ensures that even with OPAM
access, the page copies between non-EPC memory and EPC in Sanctuary are the same as
in baseline SGX.
In order to support this feature, we need to enable additional primitives than currently
available in SGX. SGX supports primitives for copying pages between EPC and non-EPC
memory and vice versa. These primitives perform the necessary checks to ensure security
guarantees (integrity and freshness). We need an additional primitive which copies data
from an non-EPC memory page to another while performing these checks. In addition, in
order to read OPAM metadata securely, we also need existing SGX primitives (EPC to non-
EPC memory and non-EPC memory to EPC) to work at granularity smaller than a page.
Prior works like Eleos [101] also propose having such primitives (sub-page access) so as
to avoid moving page worth of data between EPC and non-EPC memory when locality is
lacking.
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5.3.2.4 Dataless and Efficient Stash
Recall from Section 5.2.3 that the ORAM algorithm uses a stash structure to track
pages which could not be spilled on a path write. Prior ORAM implementations which
model stash as a hardware structure have serious limits on how large this structure can
be to limit on-chip storage. As such, when the number of blocks in stash increases to a
certain threshold, these implementations need dummy ORAM accesses to empty the stash.
A dummy ORAM access is simply an access to a random path in tree. The goal of such
accesses is to find a path where some of the blocks in the stash can be spilled so as to reduce
stash occupancy.
Sanctuary’s realization of stash obviates the need for such dummy ORAM accesses and
their concomitant overheads. In Sanctuary on a spill failure, we simply pick another page
in EPC to spill and only remember small amount of metadata for the failed spill (virtual
address of page, leaf, level). As such, our stash simply holds this metadata and is in effect
dataless which reduces overall stash footprint. Furthermore, given our stash is dataless and
in-memory we can also track larger number of spill failures.
On every ORAM access, attempt is made to spill data in stash to the tree (background
spill processing). So as to push data as close to leaf nodes as possible, entries in stash
are sorted based on the leaf currently being accessed. Tracking large number of entries
in stash can cause high overheads for this sorting. In our design, we avoid this sorting.
Instead we maintain a sorted list (by leaf-id) of available entries in stash which reduces
stash processing to simple range checks. If an accessed path has a free slot, we compare
the leaf range that can be spilled to this slot against leaf range available in stash. Only on
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0 1 2 3
leaf-ids
Node w/ data
Node w/ dummy data
Failed Spill List
(sorted by leaf id)
Page x -> leaf 0
Page y -> leaf 1
Leaf range [0, 1]
[2,3]
[0,1,2,3]
leaf ranges
Figure 5.6: Fast background spill processing. We store past failed spills in a sorted order
(by leaf id). Figure shows access of path to leaf 3 which has one empty node (checked)
to which we can potentially spill a past failed spill. We also show the leaf ranges that can
be spilled to each node. Simple range checks against these leaf ranges of available failed
spills can help us process past failed spills quickly.
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Figure 5.7: Thin nodes optimization: page movements reduce considerably with very small
increase in tree height.
an overlap, do we check the stash for overlapped range only. Figure 5.6 shows an example.
5.3.2.5 Thin Nodes Optimization
Figure 5.7 depicts the effect of lowering ORAM tree node width (z). As the tree node
width (z) decreases, the number of pages on the path also decrease, reducing page copies
and overhead per access. However, as z decreases, the probability of spill failures also
increases as the #options available to spill a page reduces (slots available on a path). Recall
from Section 5.3.2.4 that such spill failures are tracked in stash and traditional implementa-
tions rely on dummy accesses to keep stash occupancy low. In fact, for tree node width 1, an
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order of magnitude of more dummy accesses could be required making this configuration
infeasible [111].
However, in Sanctuary, a confluence of optimizations makes thin nodes feasible. First,
our stash is in-memory and is dataless making stash footprint very low. As such, we can
track large number of spill failures. Furthermore, as discussed in Section 5.3.2.4 we also
have an efficient mechanism to process stash. Finally, smart growth optimization (Sec-
tion 5.3.2.2) keeps spill failures low. Together this helps us realize thin nodes and reduce
OPAM access overheads.
5.3.2.6 Harnessing SGX Infrastructure
Recall from Section 5.2.3 that data in ORAM tree is stored in encrypted format and each
access to the tree causes pages on the accessed path to be read and re-encrypted. Baseline
SGX already has mechanisms to ensure confidentiality (encryption), integrity (MAC tag)
and freshness (nonce) for every sensitive enclave page which is spilled to non-EPC mem-
ory. We use existing SGX mechanisms while reading and writing non-EPC memory pages
as part of an OPAM access.
5.3.3 EPC-lite to reduce OPAM reliance
While our novel OPAM construct reduces the overhead of securing page movements
between EPC and non-EPC memory pages considerably, each OPAM access causes several
non-EPC memory pages to be copied and as such incurs high overheads. Recall that, we
need to rely on OPAM only to access non-EPC memory pages. As such, we could reduce
the number of OPAM accesses if we can increase EPC size.
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The key impediment to increasing EPC size is the fact that SGX provides security
guarantees for EPC pages at cache block granularity. As such, increasing EPC size causes
a commensurate increase in space and performance overheads incurred for its metadata.
Sanctuary overcomes this problem by extending EPC but providing security guarantees
at page granularity. We term our EPC extension as EPC-lite. As EPC-lite has the same
properties as EPC, page movements between EPC-lite and EPC do not use the OPAM
construct.
Supporting EPC-lite requires extending baseline SGX isolation mechanism to also
cover some non-EPC memory pages instead of only EPC pages. To support isolation for
EPC pages, baseline SGX maintains a map structure (Enclave Page Cache Map, EPCM)
which securely tracks some metadata for every EPC page. This metadata includes page
permissions, the virtual address of page and also the enclave id who owns the page. SGX
hardware checks this metadata to ensure only owing enclave issues reads/writes to an EPC
page. These checks are performed each time a TLB miss resolves to an address in EPC.
As EPC is a contiguous chunk of physical memory, checking if an address falls in EPC
is a simple range check. To support isolation for pages in EPC-lite, we propose to track
them similarly in EPCM. Also, just like baseline SGX, which marks EPC as no-DMA at
memory controller, we also need similar support for EPC-lite.
Unlike EPC which is fixed at boot time, we propose that the EPC-lite be dynamic; the
number of pages in EPC-lite can grow and shrink over time. This raises the question as
to which non-EPC memory pages can be added to EPC-lite. If we provision support for
any non-EPC memory page to be added to EPC-lite, every memory access needs to check
EPCM which will add unnecessary overheads while accessing non-sensitive pages. In order
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to avoid this, we constrain the EPC-lite region to be a contiguous memory chunk following
the EPC. Doing so, preserves the single range check currently supported in baseline SGX.
While EPC-lite is interesting from a security standpoint, it does have associated limi-
tations. Similar to EPC, deallocation of an EPC-lite page requires the request to be routed
via the secure runtime. As such, larger the EPC-lite region, smaller the non-EPC mem-
ory which implies lower the control the OS has in moving pages to the backing store and
more it’s reliance on getting an enclave to deallocate an owned page. Also, constraining
the EPC-lite to be a contiguous memory chunk as we do can lead to memory fragmentation
as enclaves can give up EPC-lite pages as they finish execution. Some form of memory
compaction in collaboration with the enclave’s secure runtime will be necessary to reduce
this fragmentation. We leave investigating this to future work.
5.4 Sanctuary Implementation
5.4.1 Sanctuary Metadata
Baseline SGX provisions metadata for every sensitive enclave page that is spilled to
non-EPC memory which it uses to load the page back in EPC at a later time while ensur-
ing security guarantees. We refer to this metadata as SGX metadata and this is different
from the metadata needed per non-EPC memory page to support ORAM construct (termed
OPAM metadata). We discuss in this section the changes to SGX metadata, OPAM meta-
data and how we separate the two and update/access them independently.
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5.4.1.1 Changes to SGX Metadata
Baseline SGX creates metadata for an EPC page being spilled to non-EPC memory so
as to be able to load the page back whilst ensuring confidentiality, integrity and freshness.
This metadata includes host of information including (but not limited to) virtual address of
the page, page permissions, enclave ID who owns the page and page type. Furthermore,
SGX also encrypts the page, generates a MAC tag over both the page data and metadata and
relies on a 8-byte nonce for freshness. Metadata so created except for nonce is stored in
non-EPC memory along with the evicted page. Despite OPAM, if this metadata is left as is,
a malicious OS can inspect it to learn which pages are being accessed. As a consequence,
in Sanctuary, we also encrypt SGX metadata. Also, recall that some non-EPC memory
pages are dummy. In order make real and dummy pages indistinguishable from each other
we also we need SGX metadata (dummy) for these pages.
Sanctuary also needs to maintain the integrity of OPAM tree. While SGX ensures con-
fidentiality, integrity and freshness for enclave’s sensitive pages in non-EPC memory, we
also need to ensure that the OS does not swap two nodes in the OPAM tree with impunity.
To avoid such attacks, the MAC tag part of SGX metadata is also created over a unique
tree-id which represents the position of the node in the tree. On an OPAM access, the
secure runtime expects to read certain tree-ids and using this modified tag we can ensure
the integrity of OPAM tree.
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5.4.1.2 OPAM Metadata
We provision metadata per non-EPC memory page (real and dummy) which aids in
the working of OPAM construct. We term this OPAM metadata and it includes the page’s
virtual address (VA), its leaf and level of OPAM tree. We need VA as the position map
simply stores VA to leaf mapping and on accessing a path in tree we need to figure out
which page matches the VA we are looking for. We need leaf and tree levels to support
efficient page shuffling. Recall that on each access, pages are shuffled to push real data as
close to leaf nodes as possible. Having leaf and level as part of metadata helps us perform
page shuffling without having to access the position map.
As we inspect OPAM metadata independent of page data (Section 5.3.2.3), we store
OPAM and SGX metadata separately. As such, we need to maintain security guarantees
for OPAM metadata separately. Consequently, we encrypt this metadata and store a MAC
tag for it. Similar to the tag that SGX stores (Section 5.4.1.1) this tag is also calculated over
tree-id.
Recall that SGX relies on 8-byte nonces (stored securely) to ensure freshness for both
non-EPC memory page and SGX metadata. We also need to provide similar guarantee for
OPAM metadata. Straightforward addition of nonces for OPAM data can increase nonce
overhead considerably. We optimize this overhead by observing that both OPAM and SGX
metadata are updated on each page access albeit sequentially. As such, we repurpose ex-
isting SGX nonce storage for both the nonces: while OPAM metadata uses nonce, SGX
metadata uses nonce+1.
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5.4.2 OPAM Implementation
In this section we discuss some relevant implementation details for OPAM, additional
hardware support we need for it and an optimization we employ.
We implement an OPAM tree with 50% utilization factor and in our evaluation we try
different tree node widths (z). Each slot in our OPAM tree stores a single non-EPC memory
page of size 4KB. Our OPAM tree supports three operations: spill which adds an EPC
page to the tree, fetch which moves a non-EPC memory page to EPC and increase
which increases the tree size by adding new non-EPC memory pages. Note that unlike
traditional ORAM implementations, our OPAM tree is exclusive; a given logical page is
either in the OPAM tree or in EPC. We do not attempt to hide the OPAM operation type
(spill, fetch etc) from the adversary. However, we do hide the page access type (read/write).
5.4.2.1 Hardware Support for Additional Paging Primitives
As discussed in Section 5.3.2.3 we rely on new paging primitives which help us decou-
ple page data and OPAM metadata access which in turn helps us reduce page copies done
in our system. We describe the new primitives and the hardware support needed for them
more concretely in this section.
Baseline SGX has support for moving a page worth of data between EPC and non-EPC
memory. While moving a page from EPC to non-EPC memory, SGX encrypts the page,
generates some metadata (Section 5.4.1.1) for the page, also generates MAC tag over page
data and metadata and relies on a 8-byte nonce for freshness. While loading back the page
from non-EPC memory to EPC, SGX checks the integrity and freshness of the page using
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the tag and the nonce and only then writes it to EPC.
In our design, we first need an additional paging primitive which copies a non-EPC
memory page to another after checking it’s freshness and integrity. Further, we also need a
primitive, which moves data between EPC and non-EPC memory at granularities smaller
than a page while also performing integrity and freshness checks. We use this primitive
to read and write OPAM metadata. While the latter primitive can be supported by adding
granularity support to existing SGX primitives, for the former primitive, we need an entirely
new primitive, which, while similar in spirit to existing primitives, instead reads a non-EPC
memory page and writes to another.
Since these non-EPC memory pages are never accessed by the enclave post the OPAM
access bringing them in caches can only pollute caches by kicking out useful data. Further-
more, using traditional loads/stores to perform these page moves will further exacerbate
their overheads. Instead, we perform these page movements at memory controller periph-
ery via a hardware unit close to the memory controller. This unit receives a list of source
and destination page addresses, reads and decrypts page contents at source address, per-
forms integrity and freshness checks just like in baseline SGX and then encrypts the page
contents and writes them to destination page address along with generating new integrity
tag and using updated freshness nonce.
5.4.2.2 Spill-ahead Optimization
As discussed in Section 5.3.1, unless the OS allocates a free EPC page to the enclave,
a miss to a newly minted stack/heap page or previously spilled EPC page will require the
enclave to pick a victim page amongst its EPC pages and spill it to non-EPC memory. This
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implies, two OPAM accesses get added to the critical path (spill EPC page, fetch non-EPC
memory page). Instead, we employ an optimization which helps us reduce the number of
OPAM access to either zero or one. If we could have secure runtime running in a parallel
thread, we could spill an EPC page ahead of time and keep a free EPC page at all times
with an enclave. This can potentially take the spill of EPC page off the critical path. We
term this as spill-ahead optimization and also evaluate such a configuration.
5.5 Applications and Security Context
We discuss in this section the cloud applications we study and also outline scenarios
where these applications manipulate sensitive data.
• Genome Processing: We study PRIMEX [89], an open source genome sequence
analysis algorithm which breaks up a given genome sequence into k-mers (substrings
of fixed length) and tracks their occurrences in the sequence in a table. This table then
aids in quick searches over the sequence.
Security Context: Genome data is highly sensitive as it can be used to identify a
person, deduce if he is susceptible to any known diseases, ancestry information and
much more. Given genome processing deals with large scale of data, cloud comput-
ing is often employed.
• Graph Processing: We study the following graph processing algorithms from Graph-
Mat [137].
PageRank: PageRank orders web pages based on some metric like popularity. Web
pages are modeled as vertices and hyperlinks as edges and the algorithm scores each
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vertex to determine its rank.
Breadth First Search (BFS): BFS takes a graph and an initial vertex and computes
the distance (number of edges) to all reachable vertices from the initial vertex.
Single Source Shortest Path (SSSP): SSSP takes a weighted graph (each edge has
corresponding weight) and an initial vertex and computes the minimum distance (us-
ing edge weights) of all vertices from the initial vertex.
Collaborative Filtering (SGD): This kernel is used by recommender systems [113]
to deduce a given user’s rating for a given item based on incomplete set of (user,
item) ratings.
Security Context: Graphs are increasingly being employed in several domains in-
cluding networks, natural language processing, social network analysis and bioin-
formatics. In response to this, several cloud-based graph analysis services have been
made available to users including GraphLab, IBM System G, Dydra and more. Given
their wide usage, graphs deal with wide range of sensitive data. Social network anal-
ysis [71] manipulates social graphs (containing sensitive information like political or
personal views of people) and is used in disease transmission analysis and sociol-
ogy. Graphs are also employed in bioinformatics to capture functional relationships
between entities like genes and proteins.
• Image Processing: We study the following image processing applications from the
San Diego Vision Benchmark Suite (SD-VBS) [141].
Scale Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT): SIFT extracts features from images
which are robust to scaling, rotation and noise. Features so extracted find variety
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of uses in object recognition, panorama stitching, 3D scene modeling, tracking and
many more.
Security context: SIFT is widely used in medical image analysis; an important step
in diagnosis and subsequent treatment of diseases. SIFT aids in medical image reg-
istration [119], segmentation of medical images [121], stitching multiple medical
images [35] and more.
Maximally Stable Extremal Regions (MSER): MSER is a method to detect blobs
in images. MSER is used in 3D reconstruction from set of images [94], object and
scene retrieval in videos e.g Video Google [134], street extraction from satellite im-
ages [120] and more.
Security Context: MSER is widely employed in visual surveillance [120] to aid in
human detection and recognition, traffic analysis and vehicular tracking. MSER also
finds utility in medical image segmentation [161].
• Redis: Redis [5] is an open source in-memory key-value data structure store. Redis
supports complex data types likes sets, hashes, lists and sorted sets. In response
to massive data explosion and bottlenecks of traditional databases, key-value stores
like Redis are a solution of choice as is evident with their wide spread adoption (
Amazon’s SimpleDB, Google’s AppEngine).
Security Context: Key-value stores are often employed as caches for frequent com-
putations like complex SQL queries over traditional databases. As such, they also
manipulate a breadth of sensitive data from commercial (stock quotes, people loca-
tion services) to medical (electronic health records) to military sectors.
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5.6 Evaluation
In this section we demonstrate the efficacy of our proposed design and implementa-
tion. We first talk about how our OPAM design helps reduce overheads of secure page
movements assuming currently supported EPC size. We then talk about how increasing
EPC size as we do with EPC-lite optimization further helps reduce the cost of page fault
channel defense.
5.6.1 Methodology
Benchmark instructions CPI Benchmark instructions CPI
primex pagerank
yeast 6.2 1.42 amazon 32.6 0.67
worm 13.6 1.39 flickr 72.2 0.77
gorilla 24.8 1.41 wiki 178.1 0.75
redis bfs
4k1800s 4.8 1.67 amazon 12.6 0.86
4k3600s 7.8 1.68 flickr 32.7 0.93
4k7200s 12.1 1.68 wiki 71.9 0.92
sgd sssp
netflix 1 11.0 1.92 amazon 12.6 0.85
netflix 2 10.8 1.92 flickr 32.6 0.93
netflix 5 10.9 1.93 wiki 71.6 0.92
mser sift
hd 3.2 0.61 hd 20.1 0.41
sun 6.7 0.77 saturn 24.8 0.42
dog 18.2 1.39 sun 1 38.9 0.42
kme 26.8 1.26 sun 2 71.9 0.43
Table 5.1: Instructions (in billions) and CPI for unsecure baseline (native execution).
Application Inputs: For genome processing application primex we run the applica-
tion with genome sequences having increasing sequence lengths from the Ensembl genome
database [1]. For graph applications, we run real-world graph datasets (Amazon, Flickr and
Wikipedia) from the University of Florida Sparse Matrix collection [46] and Netflix chal-
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lenge for collaborative filtering [26]. For image processing applications (mser, sift)
we model the largest dataset (full hd) from the San Diego Vision Benchmark Suite [141]
and also run these applications with images from MIT-Adobe fivek dataset [4] to get larger
memory footprints. We run redis using Memtier [6], a traffic pattern generator for key
value stores for 4096 bytes object size for varying durations to get increasing memory
footprints. Table 5.1 lists the instruction counts and CPI for unsecure baseline for the ap-
plications and the different input sizes.
Execution Model: We generate instruction level memory traces using PIN tool [92]
which we use to infer instruction and data TLB misses. We model a 128 entry 4-way
instruction TLB and a 64 entry 4-way data TLB. We use this TLB miss trace to infer EPC
hits and misses. For EPC misses we infer the OPAM events that we incur. We model 96MB
of EPC 1 based on current Intel SGX processors [62] and employ clock algorithm [30] for
page replacement. We also study the OPAM events incurred and resultant overheads while
modeling different EPC-lite sizes.
Performance Model: We use the OPAM events generated from the execution model
to infer the performance overheads incurred by modeling both page movement and OPAM
algorithm cost. We set the page movement (copy) cost assuming a standard memory sys-
tem with 12.8 GB/s/channel and present results for a four channel memory system. We
assume that OPAM algorithm cost is two times page movement cost. The algorithm cost
involves reading metadata blocks and inferring page movement decisions. Note that this
cost is much lower when tree levels are small and increases slowly as tree levels increase.
Finally, we also assume that a parallel thread executes the OPAM events while inferring
1While actual EPC size is 128MB, only 96MB is usable and rest is used for metadata.
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Figure 5.8: Memory footprint (accessed) of applications.
performance overheads. This helps us exploit the spill-ahead optimization (Section 5.4.2.2)
which takes EPC spills off the critical path when possible.
5.6.2 Memory Footprint of Applications
We depict in Figure 5.8 the memory footprint of various applications we model for
different input sizes. We track unique pages accessed by the application to deduce this
footprint value and further divide it into code, data, stack and heap sections. For the appli-
cations we model, the memory footprint is dominated by heap pages. We pick inputs for
the applications with increasing memory footprint size to evaluate how the overhead of fix-
ing page fault channel changes as memory footprint increasingly exceeds EPC size. As an
example, the footprint size for pagerank varies from 3X for amazon to 17X for wiki
with respect to available EPC size. For sgd we do observe that changing the number of
input movie files does lead to similar memory footprints.
Larger memory footprints are more likely to cause page movements across EPC and
non-EPC memory boundary and as such could cause larger overheads. As our optimiza-
tions (OPAM and EPC-lite memory) reduce both the number of the page movements and
cost of making them secure, the benefits of our optimizations will be more pronounced for
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Figure 5.10: (a) Realized benefit of thin nodes optimization : page moves reduce consider-
ably while OPAM events do not increase. (b) Performance overhead for existing EPC size
(96MB) with thin nodes optimization.
larger memory footprints. The memory footprints we study in this work are largely limited
by the simulation time needed to get traces for the entire application and the enormous
storage needed for the resultant traces.
5.6.3 Evaluation of Smart Tree Growth
Figure 5.9 depicts the comparison of smart tree growth and its naive counterpart. We
show the maximum spill failures (pending spill failures averaged across all applications) for
different tree node widths (z). On a page eviction from EPC we randomly pick a path in the
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Figure 5.12: EPC misses per kilo instructions.
OPAM tree to spill this page. The lower the value of z, lower the options available along
the chosen path and hence higher the chances of spill failures as is seen in Figure 5.9. While
smart growth also depicts this behavior there is several orders of magnitude of reduction in
the number of pending spill failures as compared to naive growth for higher values of z and
close to an order of magnitude of reduction for z1. By prioritizing accessed paths, smart
tree growth adds space to the OPAM tree where it is most needed and as a consequence far
less failures need to be tracked and considered on each OPAM access.
5.6.4 Benefits of Thin Nodes
Thin nodes are interesting in that they help reduce performance cost of each OPAM
event. As (z) decreases, while the performance cost of each OPAM event reduces (reduc-
tion in page moves needed), the spill failures also increase (Section 5.6.3) needing ability
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to track these failures. In order to deal with increased spill failures prior works [111] incur
an order of magnitude increase in OPAM events at lower values of (z) making such con-
figurations infeasible. As discussed in Section 5.3, while smart growth helps us keep spill
failures in check, dataless stash helps us keep the overhead of tracking spill failures low.
Together they help us realize thin nodes optimization.
Figure 5.10a depicts both the OPAM events per kilo instructions and page moves per
kilo instructions for different values of z averaged across all benchmarks. As we reduce z,
the page moves needed per OPAM access reduces which will cause commensurate reduc-
tion in performance cost of each OPAM event. At the same time, the OPAM events needed
do not increase as (z) decreases. In the following section we discuss how lower values of
z help us reduce performance overheads.
5.6.5 Sanctuary Performance
5.6.5.1 Thin nodes optimization
In Figure 5.10b, we plot the performance overheads of Sanctuary as a consequence of
OPAM events for different node widths as compared to a baseline which does not fix page
fault channel. As discussed before, thin nodes reduce page moves needed for each OPAM
event which is reflected in their lower performance overhead.
5.6.5.2 Enclave-lite optimization
We discussed in Section 5.3 how EPC-lite optimization helps us reduce the number
of OPAM transactions needed. Figure 5.11 depicts performance overheads of Sanctuary
as we increase EPC-lite memory size for a four channels memory system. As expected,
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the performance overheads drop as memory size increases as the number of OPAM events
drop and also as some of the workload’s memory footprint fits within available memory.
At 768MB memory, we see a performance overhead of mere 16% to fix page fault channel
with memory footprint of fifteen of the available twenty-six workloads fits inside available
memory.
5.6.5.3 Performance analysis
We also observe that, for a given application, the larger the delta between available
EPC and EPC-lite memory and memory footprint of the application, more are the OPAM
events incurred leading to increased overhead. However, the increase in overhead is not
commensurate to memory footprint of the application. As an example, sgd has the highest
memory footprint of all applications but not the highest performance overhead.
We observe that the OPAM events incurred by an application are more a property of its
memory access behavior than its footprint. Figure 5.12 depicts the EPC miss rates observed
per kilo instructions for applications under study. Some of the applications we model like
primex, mser exhibit very high miss rates. We observe that these high miss rates trans-
late to high performance overheads as depicted in Figure 5.11. Figure 5.10b depicts that
the average overhead drops from 3.54X (all) to a mere 1.7X (subset) in absence of
the workloads which exhibit high miss rates (worm, gorilla, dog, kme) assuming
existing EPC size (96MB).
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5.7 Related Work
5.7.1 Secure Hardware Proposals
In this section we talk about secure hardware proposals which contribute to trusted
cloud computing. None of these solutions address the page fault channel and hence can
benefit using our proposed designs. We talk about proposals which deal with fixing page
fault channel in the next section.
Several proposals aim to build secure hardware to provide trusted cloud computing en-
vironments. The execute-only memory (XOM) architecture [138] creates compartments
to isolate code and data of an application from other applications and system software. It
assumes external memory is untrusted and so provides data encryption and integrity guar-
antees. However, it is susceptible to replay attacks. Trusted Platform Module(TPM) [9]
provides a tamper resistant secure co-processor which is used to provide software attesta-
tion: a mechanism for a host to authenticate its software and hardware to a remote user. The
attestation covers all software including host OS and thus, TPM trusts host OS to provide
isolation to sensitive computation. Intels Trusted Execution Technology (TXT) [61] uses
TPM co-processor for software attestation but reduces the software included in attestation
to Virtual Machine (OS and application). The Aegis secure processor [136] trusts subset
of host OS functionality (included in software attestation) to provide isolation guarantees
to an application. The Aegis memory controller provides encryption and data integrity and
is resistant to replay attacks. Bastion [31] relies on trusted hypervisor software (included
in software attestation) to ensure isolation of an application from other applications and
untrusted OS. The trusted hypervisor is invoked on every TLB miss to ensure this isolation.
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Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [97, 23] is the latest offering to provide isolated
execution which reduces the amount of software included in software attestation to the
application and few privileged containers. It also provides encryption, data integrity and
freshness guarantees. Alternate proposals which provide SGX like security guarantees
and/or add to it [36, 52, 40] have also been proposed. Given the commercial availability
of SGX and the fact that it is already hardened against several attacks, we focus on fixing
SGX’s security vulnerabilities.
5.7.2 Prior Page Fault Channel Mitigations
Prior works which aim to tackle page fault channel exist. Like Sanctuary, Sanctum [40]
secures address translations of enclave’s sensitive pages but requires an enclave’s memory
requirements to be known a priori which is unrealistic. Also, once allocated, OS cannot
reclaim memory from an enclave. T-SGX [131] breaks an enclave into several smaller
transactions and relies on Intel Transactional Synchronization Extensions (Intel TSX) to
get notified on a page fault. However, it assumes any page fault is a potential attack. This
necessitates that enclave’s entire memory footprint fit inside EPC. Given the small size of
EPC on current SGX processors, this is also unrealistic.
In [133], the authors propose determinizing page fault access pattern by modifying
each input dependent code/data page access to also pro-actively access several more pages.
This incurs severe overheads (4000X) requiring manual program annotations and compiler
analysis to lower them. Another approach also suggested in [133] requires enclave to de-
clare a priori the set of pages it will access as a ‘contract’ and relies on processor to enforce
no page faults to such pages. However, they only demonstrate their techniques for crypto-
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graphic routines and not for general programs. Deja Vu [34] focuses on detecting privileged
attacks. To do so, it creates a reference clock within an enclave and detects if enclave exe-
cution is longer than expected which signals a possible attack. Unlike Sanctuary, Deja Vu
does not secure page movements between EPC and non-EPC memory.
5.7.3 Optimizing SGX Performance
Prior works [144, 101] which optimize SGX performance exist and can be adapted
in our system. Both Hotcalls [144] and Eleos [101] identify frequent enclave exits on
system calls as a performance bottleneck and eliminate them by offloading system call
processing to a separate thread. Eleos [101] also isolates this thread from enclave threads
in last level cache using Intel Cache Allocation Technology [38] to reduce LLC pollution
caused by system calls. SCONE [24] enables secure containers with small TCB and lower
overheads using SGX by relying on asynchronous system calls. Finally, Intel’s SGX2
extensions [150] extend SGX so allow enclaves to dynamically add/remove pages. As
part of this, they also provide support for Dynamic Regions which helps prevent frequent
enclave exits by allowing an enclave to request a range of memory to be allocated with one
call. Note that none of these works address the page fault channel.
5.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we presented Sanctuary, a page fault channel defense that preserves the
flexibility operating system enjoys in managing memory as a resource. OS page manage-
ment actions are routed through a secure runtime which uses a novel Oblivious Page Man-
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agement (OPAM) construct to make transactions with OS secure. We use near-memory
page movements to keep OPAM overhead low and also propose a novel memory partition
EPC-lite which helps reduce the OPAM transactions needed and further helps reduce over-
heads of our solutions. Our results demonstrate that Sanctuary fixes page fault channel for
a suite of cloud applications at reasonable overheads.
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CHAPTER VI
Conclusion
We are deluged with tremendous amounts of data we observe and collect everyday.
This data holds the key to understanding our world and making it better. Digitization of
medical records can help spot patterns and aid in early diagnosis of diseases. Credit card
companies can monitor transactions to identify fraudulent transactions. These are but few
examples of the kinds of solutions one can expect by processing the massive amounts of
data at our disposal.
This data explosion, however, exposes us to several new challenges. The research in
this dissertation identifies two important challenges facing us and comes up with innovative
architectures which tackle these challenges. First, we tackle the performance and energy
inefficiency of conventional architectures via our proposal Compute Caches. Second, being
cognizant of the increased demand for secure remote computation to process the massive
amounts of data being produced, we come up with low-overhead hardware designs which
defend against two important security vulnerabilities.
Today’s compute centric systems incur high instruction processing overheads and ex-
pend significant energy over the deep memory hierarchies they employ. Consequently,
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they are ill-equipped for data centric applications which process and analyze humongous
amounts of data. To tackle this inefficiency, the research in this dissertation identifies a new
near data processing technique which we term Compute Caches. Using emerging SRAM
circuit technology of bitline computing, we make a case for caches that can compute. Un-
til today, caches have served only as an intermediate low-latency storage unit. Our work
directly challenges this conventional design paradigm, and proposes to impose a dual re-
sponsibility on caches: store and compute data. By doing so, we turn them into massively
parallel vector units, and drastically reduce on chip data movement overhead.
We design simple, yet expressive, ISA extensions to expose Compute Cache function-
alities. We identify and address several challenges in realizing an architecture where caches
not only stage data but also compute. We re-designed a variety of data-centric applications,
including text processing, database query processing (FastBit), cryptographic kernels, and
OS checkpointing to leverage Compute Cache operations. Using Compute Caches as co-
processors, we demonstrated significant speedup for this gamut of applications.
Another important challenge this dissertation focuses on is enabling secure remote com-
putation. Cloud computing is increasingly being considered a viable, cost-effective way to
process the large amounts of data we produce. However, users balk from adopting cloud
computing because of security concerns. Increasing instances of data breaches and security
attacks that we are witnessing only add to users’ concerns. As such, the need for systems
which provide better security guarantees is only going to increase. To this end, the research
in this dissertation comes up with low-overhead hardware designs which defend against
two important security vulnerabilities.
Memory bus side channel is an important vulnerability in secure hardware designs.
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Merely by observing the addresses a program accesses, sensitive inputs to the program
can be re-engineered. A practically feasible low-overhead hardware design that provides
strong defenses against this vulnerability remains elusive. For example, current solutions
to mitigate address side channel incurs about 100X memory bandwidth overhead, increase
memory latency by over 20X and incur huge performance overheads (around 4X).
We instead propose InvisiMem, which uses compute capable smart memories to realize
a practically feasible low-overhead solution to close memory bus side channel. We showed
how emerging 3D stacked smart memory with packetized interface and logic layer close to
memory can efficiently address memory bus side channel vulnerabilities without needing
the ORAM construct. We also come up with a low-overhead solution to guarantee fresh-
ness using authenticated communication channel between processor and memory which
obviates the need for expensive solutions like Merkel trees. We solve memory bus timing
channel elegantly by sending heart-beat messages at a constant rate in both directions. Our
work showed for the first time that hardware security is not just a processors responsibility,
but memories have an important role to play. It closed the memory bus side channel using
secure smart memory hardware that was several orders of magnitude more efficient than
previously known solutions.
This dissertation also tackles a related vulnerability of page fault channel. A malicious
OS can use the page fault mechanism to learn the address trace of an application. Com-
mercial secure processor solutions like Intel SGX leave virtual memory management to the
OS and are susceptible to this vulnerability. Prior works which try to fix this vulnerability
assume that all application memory can be preallocated and do not let OS reclaim memory.
To overcome the limitations of prior solutions, this dissertation proposes Sanctuary, a
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low-overhead solution which closes the page fault channel. We do so, without needing to
preallocate all application memory apriori unlike prior works and still allowing the OS to
reclaim allocated memory. We design a secure runtime which collaborates with the OS to
perform page management functions on behalf of the application. We secure the runtime’s
interactions with the OS via a novel construct Oblivious page management (OPAM) which
is derived from Oblivious RAM (ORAM) construct but adapted for page management con-
text. We use near-memory page movements to keep OPAM overheads low. Finally, we
also design a novel memory partition which helps reduce the OPAM transactions needed
and further helps reduce overheads of our solutions. We study several interesting cloud
applications which process sensitive data and demonstrate how we can tackle page fault
channel with reasonable overheads.
To conclude, this dissertation identifies and addresses two important challenges that the
data deluge we are facing exposes us to. We address the performance and energy ineffi-
ciency of conventional architectures in processing massive amounts of data via our proposal
Compute Caches. We also address the increased demand for secure remote computation via
low-overhead secure hardware designs: InvisiMem and Sanctuary. Together our proposals
build a system which is better equipped to tackle massive amounts of data in a performance
and energy efficient manner while also providing strong security guarantees.
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